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We conduct a systematic empirical study of cross-sectional inequality in the United States, integrat-
ing data from the Current Population Survey, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the Consumer
Expenditure Survey, and the Survey of Consumer Finances. In order to understand how diﬀerent
dimensions of inequality are related via choices, markets, and institutions, we follow the mapping
suggested by the household budget constraint from individual wages to individual earnings, to house-
hold earnings, to disposable income, and, ultimately, to consumption and wealth. We document a
continuous and sizable increase in wage inequality over the sample period. Changes in the distrib-
ution of hours worked sharpen the rise in earnings inequality before 1982, but mitigate its increase
thereafter. Taxes and transfers compress the level of income inequality, especially at the bottom of
the distribution, but have little eﬀect on the overall trend. Finally, access to ﬁnancial markets has
limited both the level and growth of consumption inequality.
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The evolution of economic inequality in the United States has been extensively studied. One branch
of the literature has focused on the wages of full-time men, using data from the March Current
Population Survey (CPS). This work aims to describe the evolution of dispersion in productivity and
skills, and to trace its macroeconomic sources to changes in technology, trade, or institutions (see
Katz and Autor, 1999, for a survey). Another branch of the literature has focused on labor supply,
studying, for example, how changes in female participation aﬀect measures of economic inequality
(see Cancian and Reed, 1998). Other authors have emphasized that the extent to which increasing
dispersion is permanent or transitory in nature has important implications for policy and welfare, and
have investigated income dynamics using the longitudinal dimension of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) (e.g., Gottschalk and Moﬃtt, 1994). This shift from studying the sources of rising
inequality toward exploring its welfare implications continues with papers investigating the dynamics
of inequality in household consumption, a more direct measure of well-being, using the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX) (e.g., Cutler and Katz, 1991).
Although much has been learned from these studies, the literature lacks a systematic analysis of
US cross-sectional inequality that jointly examines all the key measures of economic inequality: wages,
hours, income, consumption, and wealth. In this paper, we try to ﬁll this gap, using comparable sam-
ples from the most widely used household-level data sets. Our key organizing device is the household
budget constraint, which provides a natural framework for understanding how diﬀerent dimensions of
inequality are related via endogenous choices, markets, and institutions. We begin with changes in the
structure of individual wages as our most primitive measure of inequality, and from there take a series
of steps to contrast inequality in individual wages to that in individual earnings, household earnings,
pre-government income, disposable income, and, ultimately, consumption and wealth. Along the way,
we evaluate the impact on measured inequality of individual labor supply, household income pooling,
private transfers and asset income, government redistribution, and household net saving.
Our empirical analysis of inequality for the United States should serve as a useful input to the
quantitative macroeconomic research aimed at understanding how individual-level risk aﬀects the
distribution of economic outcomes. With a sharper characterization of the facts, structural models can
be more conﬁdently applied to exploring the cross-sectional relationship between risk and outcomes—
already the subject of a large literature in quantitative macroeconomics (e.g., Imrohoroglu, 1989;
Huggett, 1993; Aiyagari, 1994; R´ ıos-Rull, 1995; Casta˜ neda et al., 2003; Storesletten et al., 2004a).
1We now brieﬂy summarize our key substantive ﬁndings.
Inequality in individual wages rises steadily from the early 1970s for men and from the early
1980s for women. However, dispersion in hourly wages increases mostly at the bottom of the wage
distribution in the 1970s, throughout the distribution in the 1980s, and at the top after 1990.
Shifting the focus from wage to earnings inequality, we detect a strikingly important role for labor
supply. First, the cross-sectional variance of log male earnings increases much more rapidly than the
variance of log male wages until the mid-1980s. The reason is that relative hours worked for low-
skilled men declined in the 1970s as unemployment rose sharply, exacerbating earnings inequality at
the bottom. Second, the age proﬁle for wage inequality is concave, while that for earnings inequality
is convex. This diﬀerence reﬂects the fact that hours dispersion is high for young workers (due to high
unemployment), declines for prime-age workers, and then rises again for old workers (due to early
retirement).
Going from individual to household earnings, we ﬁnd that household earnings inequality increases
less than earnings inequality for the main earner at the top of the distribution, but not at the bot-
tom. Moving from earnings to disposable income, taxes and public transfers compress inequality
dramatically. They are also an important buﬀer against rising earnings inequality in the 1970s.
The ﬁnal step in tracing out the household budget constraint is from disposable income to con-
sumption. The gap between the two is informative about the smoothing role of borrowing and saving.
We examine this key relationship from three diﬀerent viewpoints. First, in the time series, we ﬁnd
that cross-sectional inequality in non-durable consumption increases by less than half as much as
inequality in disposable income. Second, we ﬁnd an analogous result in the life-cycle dimension:
only a fraction of the age increase in within-cohort dispersion in income translates into dispersion in
consumption. Third, by exploiting the longitudinal dimension of the PSID, we can distinguish the
relative importance of permanent and transitory shocks: the former are more likely to pass through
to consumption, the latter are more easily insurable. Here, we focus on the volatility of “residual”
wages, which most closely reﬂect idiosyncratic and unforeseen labor market ﬂuctuations. We detect
a rise in the permanent variance in the decade 1975–1985, precisely the period when cross-sectional
consumption inequality rises the most.
We also investigate directly the dynamics of wealth inequality in the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) and show that the Gini coeﬃcient for net worth increases by 5 points from 1983 to 2007.
Finally, when we focus on the dynamics of inequality at higher frequencies, we ﬁnd that cyclical
ﬂuctuations in CPS per capita income are twice as large as in National Income and Produce Accounts
2(NIPA) personal income. Thus, viewed through the lens of micro data, business cycles are more
dramatic events. Household earnings at lower percentiles of the income distribution decline very
rapidly in recessions, such that recessions are times when earnings inequality widens sharply. Since we
do not ﬁnd similar dynamics for individual wages, we conclude that the root of such large ﬂuctuations
in earnings cyclicality is labor supply—especially unemployment.
Our paper makes three contributions that are more methodological in nature.
First, we check whether the CPS, CEX, and PSID tell a consistent story with respect to various
measures of cross-sectional dispersion. We ﬁnd that, with the exception of two discrepancies that we
discuss in this paper, they align closely with respect to wages, hours, earnings, and disposable income.
This ﬁnding is reassuring, since it means that researchers can estimate individual income dynamics
from the PSID, or measure consumption inequality in the CEX, and safely make comparisons to
cross-sectional moments from the much larger CPS sample.
Second, we show that combining income or consumption data from the CPS, PSID, or CEX with
wealth data from the SCF can be misleading, since the SCF contains more high-wealth and high-
income households. We ﬁnd that dropping the top 1.47% of the wealth distribution in the SCF
yields a sample that is comparable to the other three surveys. This adjustment reduces the ratio of
mean wealth to mean pre-tax income—a common calibration target for heterogeneous-agent macro
models—from 4.5 to 3.3.
Finally, we demonstrate that a standard permanent-transitory model for individual wage dynamics
appears misspeciﬁed, since it cannot jointly replicate cross-sectional moments for wages in levels, and
corresponding moments for wages in ﬁrst-diﬀerences. Domeij and Floden (2009, this volume) and
Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln et al. (2009, this volume) report a similar ﬁnding for Sweden and Germany.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our three primary data sources: the
CPS, the PSID, and the CEX. Section 3 compares measures of per capita income and consumption in
the NIPA to those constructed from the surveys. Section 4 describes the trends of US cross-sectional
inequality over time. Section 5 focuses on the life-cycle dimension. Section 6 provides a detailed
comparison of several measures of inequality across the three data sets. Section 7 exploits the panel
dimension of the PSID to estimate the transitory and permanent components of individual wage
dynamics. Section 8 explores wealth data from the SCF. Section 9 concludes. Many details of the
empirical analysis are omitted from the main text and collected in the Appendix.
32 Three data sets
In this section, we describe our three main data sets: the CPS, the PSID, and the CEX. The Appendix
contains more detail on each survey and a discussion of comparability across data sets. A brief
description of the SCF is contained in Section 8.
2.1 CPS
The CPS is the source of oﬃcial US government statistics on employment and unemployment, and
is designed to be representative of the civilian non-institutional population. The Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) applies to the sample surveyed in March, and extends the set of
demographic and labor force questions asked in all months to include detailed questions on income.
For the ASEC supplement, the basic CPS monthly sample of around 60,000 households is extended
to include an additional 4,500 Hispanic households (since 1976), and an additional 34,500 households
(since 2002) as part of an eﬀort to improve estimates of children’s health insurance coverage: this is
the “SCHIP” sample.
The basic unit of observation is a housing unit, so we report CPS statistics on inequality at the
level of the household (rather than at the level of the family).1 The March CPS contains detailed
demographic data for each household member and labor force and income information for each house-
hold member age 15 or older. Labor force and income information correspond to the previous year.
We use the March supplement weights to produce our estimates.
2.2 PSID
The PSID is a longitudinal study of a sample of US individuals (men, women, and children) and
the family units in which they reside. The PSID was originally designed to study the dynamics of
income and poverty. For this purpose, the original 1968 sample was drawn from two independent
sub-samples: an over-sample of roughly 2,000 poor families selected from the Survey of Economic
Opportunities (SEO), and a nationally representative sample of roughly 3,000 families designed by
the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan.
Since 1968, the PSID has interviewed individuals from families in the initial samples. Adults have
been followed as they have grown older, and children have been observed as they have advanced into
adulthood, forming family units of their own (the “split-oﬀs”). Survey waves are annual from 1968
1A “household” is deﬁned as all persons, related or unrelated, living together in a dwelling unit. The “family unit” is
deﬁned as all persons living together who are usually related by blood, marriage, or adoption. For example, a household
can be composed of more than one family.
4to 1997, and biennial since then. The PSID is the longest-running representative household panel for
the United States.
The PSID data ﬁles provide a wide variety of information about both families and individuals, with
substantial detail on income sources and amounts, employment status and history, family composition
changes, and residential location. Although some information is collected about all individuals in the
family unit, the greatest level of detail is ascertained for the primary adults in the family unit, i.e.,
the head (the husband in a married couple) and the spouse, when present.
We base our empirical analysis on the SRC sample. We use all the yearly surveys (1967–1996) and
the biennial surveys for 1999, 2001, and 2003. Since the SRC sample was initially representative of
the US population, the PSID does not provide weights for this sample. The primary concern about
the representativeness of this sample is that it does not capture the post-1968 inﬂow of immigrants to
the United States. We return to this point in Section 6.
2.3 CEX
The CEX consists of two separate surveys, the quarterly Interview Survey and the Diary Survey, both
collected for the Bureau of Labor Statistics by the Census Bureau. It is the only US data set that
provides detailed information about household consumption expenditures. The Diary Survey focuses
only on expenditures on small, frequently purchased items (such as food, beverages, and personal
care items), whereas the Interview Survey aims at providing information on up to 95% of the typical
household’s consumption expenditures. In this study, we will focus only on the Interview Survey (see
Attanasio et al., 2007, for a study that uses both the Diary and the Interview surveys).
The CEX Interview Survey is a rotating panel of households that are selected to be representa-
tive of the US population. It started in 1960, but continuous data are available only from the ﬁrst
quarter of 1980, which is the start of our sample. Each quarter the survey reports, for the cross
section of households interviewed, detailed demographic characteristics for all household members,
detailed information on consumption expenditures for the three-month period preceding the inter-
view, and information on income, hours worked, and taxes paid over a yearly period.2 Each household
is interviewed for a maximum of four consecutive quarters.
2See the Appendix for more details on the issue that income and consumption measures refer to periods that are
never of the same length and that are, in some cases, non-overlapping.
52.4 Sample selection
In each of our three data sets, we construct three diﬀerent samples, which we label Samples A, B, and
C. Table 1 shows the number of records in each data set that are lost at each stage of the selection
process.
Sample A is the most inclusive and is essentially a cleaned version of the raw data. We drop
records only if 1) there is no information on age for either the head or spouse, 2) either the head or
spouse has positive labor income but zero annual hours (zero weeks worked in the CPS), or 3) either
the head or spouse has an hourly wage less than half of the corresponding federal minimum wage in
that year. In the CEX, we also drop households reporting implausible consumption expenditures.3 In
order to reduce measurement error in income and hours, we also exclude CEX households ﬂagged as
“incomplete income reporters” (see Nelson, 1994) and PSID households if labor income is missing but
hours worked are positive. Sample A is designed to be representative of the entire US population and
is used for Figures 1 and 3, where we compare per capita means from micro data to NIPA aggregates.
Sample B is further restricted by dropping a household from Sample A if no household member is
of working age, which we deﬁne as between the ages of 25 and 60 (in the PSID we drop households
if neither the head nor the spouse, when present, falls in this age range). The household head is the
oldest working age male, as long as there is at least one working-age male in the household; otherwise
the head is the oldest working-age female. Sample B is our household-level sample and is used for
Figure 2 and Figures 8–14.
Sample C instead is an individual-level sample. To construct it, we ﬁrst select all individuals age
25–60 who belong to households in Sample B. From this group we then select those who work at least
260 hours during the year. Sample C is used for Figures 4–7 and 15–18.
Table 2 reports statistics on some key demographic characteristics for Sample B. The table indicates
broad agreement across data sets, both in terms of levels and with respect to demographic trends over
time. One exception is that the fraction of white males is declining over time in the CPS and the
CEX but is stable in the PSID. This reﬂects higher attrition for non-whites in the PSID, coupled
with the fact that the PSID misses disproportionately-non-white recent immigrants. In addition, a
signiﬁcantly larger fraction of households (families) in the PSID contain married couples, suggesting
that the PSID under-samples non-traditional households.
3Speciﬁcally, when quarterly equivalized food consumption is below $100 in 2000 dollars. In the PSID, we categorize
records as implausible when either (i) equivalized food consumption is below $400 per year, (ii) food stamps exceed
$50,000, or (iii) food expenditures exceed ten times disposable income. In such cases, we drop households, but only when
computing moments involving food consumption.
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Figure 1: Comparison between averages in CPS and NIPA: labor and pre-tax income
Throughout the paper, we express all income and expenditure variables in year 2000 dollars. The
price deﬂator used is the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI-U series, all items.
In all data sets, we forecast mean values for top-coded observations by extrapolating a Pareto
density ﬁtted to the non-top-coded upper end of the observed distribution. We apply this procedure
separately to each component of income in each year. Top-coding aﬀects very few observations in the
PSID but is a more serious concern in the CPS and the CEX.
3 Means
We begin by comparing the evolution of average household earnings, income, and consumption in our
micro data to the oﬃcial Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) NIPA, over the period 1967–2005.
Labor income The income deﬁnition that is conceptually most similar across the CPS and the
NIPA is labor income (wage and salary income, excluding self-employment income).4
The left panel of Figure 1 compares labor income in the CPS to the NIPA. Both series are per capita,
real and logged.5 Labor income aligns remarkably well, in terms of levels, trends, and business cycle
ﬂuctuations. On average across the 1967–2005 period, the CPS statistic exceeds its NIPA counterpart
by 0.27%. The average absolute discrepancy is 1.1%. In the early 1990s, CPS labor income rises
4The NIPA labor income measure is “wage and salary disbursements” (NIPA Table 2.1, line 3). Two minor diﬀerences
between the CPS and NIPA measures are worth noting (Ruser et al., 2004). The ﬁrst is that the BEA classiﬁes as
dividends all S corporation proﬁts distributed to shareholders, whereas the Census treats these proﬁts as wage and
salary income if the recipients are shareholder-employees. The second is that the BEA (but not the CPS) makes an
upward adjustment for wage and salary income earned in the underground economy from legal but “oﬀ the books”
activities.
5The US population estimate is from NIPA Table 7.1, line 16.
7somewhat more rapidly than in the NIPA, a ﬁnding previously noted by Roemer (2002). Conversely,
in the early 2000s the decline in CPS labor income is less evident than in the NIPA.6
Pre-tax income The CPS measure of pre-tax income includes labor income, self-employment
income, net ﬁnancial income, and private and public transfers. This is our version of the “money
income” concept constructed by the Census. Labor income alone accounts for fully three-quarters
of total CPS pre-tax income. The corresponding NIPA income measure is “personal income” (NIPA
Table 2.1, line 1). The two measures are reported in the right panel of Figure 1.
Even though the long-run trends in these two measures line up well, on average across the sample
period, CPS income falls 21% short of NIPA income. In light of the previous discussion, this gap must
be attributed to income other than labor income. The NIPA-CPS gap widens over time, by around
10 percentage points of NIPA income. There are several reasons for this gap.
First, there is a downward bias in the CPS income series arising from internal censoring of high
income values: our treatment of externally top-coded observations described in the Appendix should
largely correct for this problem.7
Second, there is an important conceptual diﬀerence between survey-based income measures and
NIPA income. The surveys record cash income received directly by individuals, whereas the NIPA
records cash and in-kind income collected on behalf of individuals.8 The “by” versus “on behalf of”
distinction means that dividends, interest, and rents received on behalf of individuals by pension plans,
nonproﬁts, and ﬁduciaries is in NIPA income but not survey income. The “cash” versus “cash and
in-kind” distinction means that employer contributions for employee pension and health insurance
funds are in NIPA income but not survey income. Employer contributions of this type rose from 4.3%
of NIPA personal income in 1967 to 9.0% in 2005, explaining a large part of the widening NIPA-CPS
gap.9
6The reliability of CPS labor income reporting is conﬁrmed by Roemer (2002), who matches individuals in the March
CPS to detailed earnings records from the Social Security Administration (DER). He ﬁnds that part-year, part-time
workers have underestimated March CPS wages (CPS/DER ratio around 90%), but that for all other groups, wages
align very closely.
7At the start of the sample period our CPS estimate for per capita income exceeds the oﬃcial Census series by over
7%. This gap narrows to less than 1% towards the end of the period as the Census increased internal censoring points.
For example between 1992 and 1993, when the censoring point for earnings on the primary job rose from $300,000 to
$1m, the gap narrows from 5.3% to 2.5%.
8Table 1 in Ruser et al. (2004) provides a careful and detailed account of the diﬀerences. They ﬁnd that in 2001, 64%
of the $2.23 trillion gap between aggregate NIPA personal income and aggregate CPS money income can be accounted
for by diﬀerences in income concepts.
9Similarly the NIPA includes (but the surveys exclude) the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing and
in-kind transfers such as Medicare, Medicaid, and food stamps. In the other direction, the surveys include but the
NIPA excludes personal contributions for social insurance, income from private pension and annuities plans, income
from government employee retirement plans, and income from interpersonal transfers, such as child support.
8In addition to these conceptual diﬀerences, an additional gap between the NIPA and survey-based
estimates arises because survey respondents tend to under-report a range of types of income, while
the BEA attempts in a variety of ways to make upward adjustments for components of income that
are self-reported.10
Cyclical ﬂuctuations The CPS mirrors the business cycle ﬂuctuations evident in the NIPA
income series. However, cyclical ﬂuctuations appear larger in the CPS than in the NIPA. From peak
to trough, percentage real income declines in the CPS (NIPA) for the recessions in the mid-1970s,
early 1980s, early 1990s and early 2000s are 3.9 (2.2), 6.6 (2.9), 5.1 (2.3), and 2.2 (1.3). Even though
recession declines in per-capita pre-tax income are roughly twice as large in the CPS, declines in wages
and salary income are very similar in magnitude. Thus, the diﬀerence in business cycle dynamics must
be attributed to unearned components of income. Future work should more precisely characterize the
reason for this discrepancy. Once the reasons are understood, it will become clear whether any speciﬁc
macroeconomic model should target, or use as an input, the NIPA-based or the survey-based measure
of average income. In the meantime, it is important to be aware that macro and micro data paint
diﬀerent pictures for the size of cyclical ﬂuctuations.11
Wages and hours Figure 2 plots average wages and hours over the sample period.12 Wages
are computed as annual earnings divided by annual hours, where earnings includes labor income plus
two-thirds of self-employment income.13
The average real wage for women rises by 36% over the period. In contrast, the corresponding
increase for men is only 14%, with real wage declines in the 1970s and 1980s recouped in the 1990s.
Business cycle ﬂuctuations are evident in both average wage series.
Average male hours decline in the 1970s and are broadly stable thereafter.14 In contrast, female
10For example, the proprietors’ income adjustment is based on evidence that proprietors’ actual income in 1999 was
more than double levels reported on tax returns. Ruser et al. (2004) note that it is likely that respondents who under-
report to the IRS also under-report in voluntary surveys. Comparing various components of income across the CPS and
other independent estimates, Ruser et al. note that under-reporting in the CPS seems to be important for private and
government retirement income, interest and dividend income, and social security income.
11The higher cyclicality of mean income in survey data relative to National Accounts is not a unique feature of the
United States. It is also present, for example, in German and UK data. See Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln et al. (2009, this volume)
and Blundell and Etheridge (2009, this volume) in this volume.
12The estimates of average hours in Figure 2 are based on all 25-60 year-old individuals in Sample B, including those
working zero hours. Average wages apply to Sample C, which excludes individuals working less than 260 hours in the
year.
13Prior to income year 1975, CPS information on hours—and thus wages—is not ideal because the question about
weekly hours refers to hours worked last week (rather than usual weekly hours). Moreover, information about weeks
worked in the previous year is available only in intervals prior to 1975. We have used information for years in which both
measures of hours are available to splice together estimates for the 1967–1974 period and those for the later period.
14Our CPS estimates align very closely by year and age group with the decennial Census-based estimates of McGrattan
and Rogerson (2004, Table 3).
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Figure 2: Average wages and hours worked for men and women (CPS)
market hours increase dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s, as female wages rise relative to male
wages. This growth in female participation slows in the 1990s, at the same time that male wage
growth resumes.
The growing importance of women in the labor market is central to reconciling stagnant real hourly
wages and hours worked for male workers (Figure 2) with rising per capita labor income (Figure 1).
Over the sample period, two-thirds of the growth in labor income per capita is attributable to growth
in female labor income per capita. Rising female labor income, in turn, reﬂects both rising average
hours for women and rising average labor income per hour. Of the two, the former is more important:
hours worked per woman increase by 92% over the sample period; real female labor income per hour
rises by 30%. Most of the increase in female hours is on the extensive margin.15
Consumption Figure 3 reports various measures of per capita consumption for the CEX and
the PSID, and contrasts them with comparable aggregates for personal consumption expenditures from
the NIPA. The top left panel reports aggregate expenditure on food (including alcoholic beverages and
15Hours are computed using hours worked last week, which is available throughout the sample period.
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Figure 3: Comparison between averages in CEX and in NIPA: consumption
food away from home). The plot conﬁrms that food expenditures in the CEX and the PSID track each
other fairly closely, especially in the earlier part of the sample (see Blundell et al., 2008, for a similar
ﬁnding). However, the survey-based estimates are lower than NIPA food expenditure, and, more
disturbingly, the gap between the two series is increasing over time. This growing discrepancy—from
20 to 60%—is even more marked for a broader deﬁnition of non-durable consumption (the top-right
panel).16 The bottom two panels show that a widening gap is also evident, though less pronounced,
for expenditures on durables and housing services.17
Some recent research investigates the large and growing gap between CEX and NIPA aggregate
consumption (Slesnick, 2001; Garner et al., 2006). Conceptual diﬀerences between the CEX and the
NIPA can account for some of the discrepancy. For example, among medical care expenditures, a
rapidly growing item in NIPA consumption, the BEA includes expenditures by Medicare, Medicaid,
and private insurers, whereas the CEX reports only out-of-pocket expenses. However, as Figure 3
16The deﬁnition (in both NIPA and CEX) includes the following categories of non-durables and services: food, clothing,
gasoline, household operation, transportation, medical care, recreation, tobacco, and education.
17Durable consumption includes expenditures on vehicles and furniture. Expenditures on housing services include
imputed rent on owner-occupied housing plus rent paid by renters.
11makes clear, the growing gap between the CEX and the NIPA applies across a broad range of con-
sumption categories, suggesting that speciﬁc deﬁnitional diﬀerences are only part of the explanation.18
Another candidate explanation is that the CEX sample under-represents the upper tail of the
income and consumption distributions, and that growth in aggregate consumption has been largely
driven by these missing wealthy households. However, one would expect this type of sample bias to
show up in income as well as in consumption, and it does not: CEX per capita income tracks NIPA
per capita income well (see Section 6).
Interestingly, survey-based aggregate consumption also fails to keep up with survey-based income
and with national accounts consumption in the UK (see Blundell and Etheridge, 2009, this volume),
whereas the problem is absent in other countries, such as Canada and Germany (see Brzozowski et
al., 2009; Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln et al., 2009, this volume). Understanding the reasons for this discrepancy
remains an important open research question.
4 Inequality over time
This section is devoted to characterizing the evolution of cross-sectional inequality in the United States
in the last 40 years. We ﬁnd that making general statements about inequality over this period is
diﬃcult for two reasons. First, the speciﬁc metric for inequality matters, since measures of dispersion
that emphasize the bottom of the distribution (such as the P50–P10 ratio or the variance of log)
often evolve quite diﬀerently from measures that emphasize the top of the distribution (such as the
P90–P50 ratio or the Gini coeﬃcient). Second, and more importantly, wages, earnings, income, and
consumption exhibit surprisingly diﬀerent dynamics.
To understand why, we trace out the mapping suggested by the household budget constraint
from dispersion in individual wages (reﬂecting inequality in human capital endowments) to dispersion
in household consumption (reﬂecting inequality in welfare).19 The steps in this mapping are from
individual wages to earnings, from individual earnings to household earnings, from household earnings
to disposable income, and ultimately from disposable income to consumption.
To our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper documenting the joint evolution of all these variables
in the United States using comparable samples from several surveys. The closest papers to ours are
18For example, Garner et al. (2006) show that the ratio between CEX and NIPA expenditures for the speciﬁc category
“Pets, toys and playground equipment,”declines from 0.71 in 1984 to 0.48 in 2002.
19Clearly, wages are only an imperfect proxy for skill endowments. But within the typical set of variables available in
micro data, they are the closest. Similarly, household consumption is an imperfect proxy for household welfare. Leisure
is another important determinant of welfare, but it is harder to measure. See Aguiar and Hurst (2007) for a study on
trends in leisure inequality over the last four decades, based on time-use surveys.
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Figure 4: Wage inequality for men and women (CPS)
Burtless (1999) and Gottschalk and Danziger (2005), which explore the mapping from wages to pre-
tax income in the CPS. However, they do not document trends in disposable income, consumption,
or wealth. For common variables and overlapping sample periods, our results line up well with theirs.
4.1 Individual-level inequality
Wages We begin our discussion of individual-level inequality with wages. Figure 4 displays four
measures of dispersion in hourly wages by gender.20
The variance of log hourly male wages increases throughout the period, while the variance of log
female wages is relatively stable in the 1970s but increases rapidly in the 1980s. The Gini coeﬃcient
increases throughout the sample period, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Quantitatively, the overall
rise in wage inequality is substantial. The variance of male wages rises by around 21 log points, and
the Gini by 11 points. The corresponding ﬁgures for women are 16 and 7 log points. Eckstein and
Nagypal (2004, Figure 3) report similar ﬁndings.
20Recall that all the individual-level statistics are computed on Sample C, which includes individuals age 25–60 who
work at least 260 hours per year, with wages at least half of the legal federal minimum wage.
13Turning to the percentile ratios, we uncover diﬀerent trends in the top and bottom halves of the
wage distribution.
The male 50th–10th percentile ratio (P50–P10) rises steadily until the late 1980s but is quite stable
thereafter. The pattern for women is similar, except that almost all of the increase in the female P50–
P10 is concentrated in the 1980s. Women are paid less than men on average, and are twice as likely to
be paid at or below the federal minimum wage.21 Wage compression induced by the minimum wage
ﬂoor may explain why the average level of the P50–P10 is lower for women. Interestingly, the 1980s,
when the female P50–P10 wage ratio increases sharply, was a period when the US federal minimum
wage was held constant in nominal terms (from January 1981), and declined dramatically in real
terms.22
The level of inequality at the top of the wage distribution as measured by the 90th–50th percentile
ratio (P90-P50) is similar for men and women. Inequality at the top increases throughout the sample
period, and especially after 1980, with wages at the 90th percentile rising slightly more for men than
for women, relative to the corresponding medians.
To summarize, the increases in US wage dispersion in (i) the 1970s, (ii) the 1980s, and (iii) the 1990s
were concentrated, respectively, (i) within the bottom half of the wage distribution, (ii) throughout
the wage distribution, and (iii) in the top half of the wage distribution.
A large empirical literature documents the evolution of cross-sectional wage inequality in the
United States since the mid-1960s. The two most recent and comprehensive surveys are Katz and
Autor (1999), and Eckstein and Nagypal (2004). A more up-to-date account is provided by Autor et
al. (2008).23 All of these papers are based on CPS data and focus only on full-time, full-year workers,
i.e. individuals who work at least 35 hours per week and 40 plus weeks per year. Our analysis is
based on a much broader sample, given our more inclusive criterion for hours worked. Nevertheless,
the qualitative trends we uncover are very similar to these previous studies. A unique contribution
of our study (see Section 6) will be to document that measured changes in the wage structure in the
CEX and the PSID line up very well with those in the larger CPS sample.
21About 4% of women paid hourly rates reported wages at or below the prevailing Federal minimum in
2002, compared to 2% of men. For more details on the characteristics of minimum wage workers, see
http://www.bls.gov/cps/minwage2002.htm
22Lee (1999) and Card and DiNardo (2002) claim that the US federal minimum wage has a large impact in shaping
the bottom of the wage distribution. The real minimum wage was stable at around $8.50 (in 2008 dollars) between 1967
and 1979, then declined steadily to reach $5.50 in 1990. If plotted together, the inverse of the real minimum wage and
the P50–P10 ratio comove very closely, especially for women.
23Historically, the widening of the US wage structure during the 1980s was ﬁrst documented by Davis and Haltiwanger
(1991), Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992), Murphy and Welch (1992),
and Juhn et al. (1993), among others.
14Observables and residuals In order to understand the sources of the rise in US wage inequal-
ity, it is important to distinguish the role of some key observable demographics such as education,
age, and gender. We perform this decomposition in Figure 5. We deﬁne the male education premium
as the ratio between the average hourly wage of male workers with at least 16 years of schooling, and
the average wage of male workers with less than 16 years of schooling. The pattern that emerges is
the well-documented U-shape: the college wage premium declines until the late 1970s and then starts
rising steadily. In 1975, US college graduates earned 40% more than high school graduates, while in
2005 they earned 90% more. A vast literature argues that upward trends in relative quantities and
prices for college-educated labor reﬂect a skill-biased demand shift, associated with the technological
shift toward information and communications technology (ICT), and to globalization (e.g., Katz and
Murphy, 1992; Krusell et al., 2000; Acemoglu, 2002; Hornstein et al., 2005).24
The experience (age) wage premium plotted in Figure 5 is deﬁned as the ratio between the average
hourly wage of 45–55-year-olds and the hourly wage of 25–35-year-olds. The male experience premium
more than doubles (from 20% to 40%) between 1975 and the end of the sample period. The increase for
women is smaller and occurs somewhat later.25 In the literature, the rise in the experience premium has
received much less attention than the skill premium. One explanation emphasizes demographic change,
i.e., the passage through the labor market of the baby boom generation, and growth in the number
of working women, who tend to be younger than working men (Jeong et al., 2008). An alternative
hypothesis is that recent technological change has favored more experienced workers, especially among
less-educated groups (Weinberg, 2005).
The plot of the gender wage premium (the ratio of the average hourly wage of men to the average
hourly wage of women) in Figure 5 shows that, on average, men earned 65% more per hour than
women in 1975, but only 30% more in 2005. This convergence was concentrated in the 1980s: from
the early 1990s there has been little additional reduction in the raw gender gap.
The last panel of Figure 5 displays residual wage inequality for males, measured as the variance of
residuals from a regression of log wages on standard demographics.26 Residual wage dispersion rises
throughout the period. A comparison with the variance of “raw” wage inequality reveals that rising
residual inequality accounts for essentially all of the increase in cross-sectional male wage dispersion in
24Eckstein and Nagypal (2004) and, more recently, Lemieux (2006) document that the premium for postgraduate
education increased even faster.
25Eckstein and Nagypal (2004, Figure 15) plot the coeﬃcient on experience from a standard Mincerian wage regression
and ﬁnd a pattern very similar to ours: the experience premium for women is much lower than for men, and for both
sexes it rises in the 1970s and 1980s and stabilizes in the 1990s.
26See the Appendix for the exact regression speciﬁcation.
















































Figure 5: Education, experience, gender wage premia, and residual wage inequality (CPS)
the 1970s but only about two-thirds of the rise since 1980. The other third is explained by changes in
the relative “prices” of observable characteristics, particularly experience in the 1980s, and education
in the 1980s and 1990s.
Labor supply The bottom right panel of Figure 6 plots the variance of log earnings for men
and women. The variance of male earnings increases by 30 log points over the sample period, with
two-thirds of this increase concentrated between 1967 and 1982.27 Dispersion in female earnings, in
sharp contrast, is essentially trendless. It is perhaps surprising that the pictures for dispersion in
earnings looks so diﬀerent from those for dispersion in wages in the top left panel, given that we
measure wages as earnings per hour.
Mechanically, the variance of log earnings is equal to the variance of log wages plus the variance of
log hours plus twice the covariance between log wages and log hours. With this in mind, the top right
27Kopczuk et al. (2009, Figure 1) document a similar trend for male earnings inequality (fast rise in the 1970s and
1980s, slower rise in the 1990s) from Social Security Administration data.









Variance of Log Hourly Wages
Year










Variance of Log Annual Hours
Year









Correl. btw Log Hours and Log Wages
Year














Figure 6: Inequality in labor supply and earnings of men and women (CPS)
panel of Figure 6 indicates that the variance of log female hours falls from 0.28 to 0.20, which partially
oﬀsets the impact of rising wage dispersion on female earnings inequality. This decline in female hours
dispersion toward the level for men mirrors the convergence in female wages and hours (recall Figure
2). Inequality in male hours is sharply counter-cyclical, but exhibits no obvious long-run trend.28
The bottom left panel of Figure 6 shows the correlation between log wages and log hours, and
sheds light on the dramatic increase in the variance of male earnings. In particular, the correlation
increases sharply in the ﬁrst half of the sample period, precisely when earnings dispersion is rising
most rapidly.
Earnings Figure 7 delves deeper into the evolution of inequality in male earnings. Here we
28Recall that individuals are in the sample as long as they work at least 260 hours per year (one quarter of part-time
employment). We have experimented with slightly higher and lower thresholds, and we found that the absence of a trend
in hours inequality is robust.















































































































Figure 7: Understanding male earnings inequality (CPS)
rank men by earnings, and for each decile of the earnings distribution compute average hours and
average wages. To focus on dynamics, we plot percentage changes for each variable relative to 1967.29
The top left panel of the ﬁgure indicates that, relative to 1967, earnings of the bottom decile
declined in real terms by 60% in the period up to 1982 before recovering somewhat in the 1990s.
Earnings for the top decile rose steadily throughout the sample period. The top right and bottom
left panels of the ﬁgure make a striking point: earnings dynamics at the top of the male earnings
distribution are entirely driven by changes in wages, while changes in hours play a central role in
shaping earnings dynamics at the bottom of the distribution. To see this, note that hours at the top
of the male earnings distribution are stable and evolve very similarly to those at the median, while
wages consistently grow more rapidly. Conversely, in the 1970s, when inequality at the bottom rises
29In every year both average wages and average hours increase monotonically across the bins ranked by earnings.
18sharply, wage dynamics for the bottom decile of the earnings distribution are very similar to those
for the median (more exactly, the P45-P55), showing a small decline. Instead, hours for these two
groups evolve very diﬀerently: hours for the median are very stable, while hours for the bottom decile
ﬂuctuate dramatically as a virtual mirror image of the unemployment rate (the bottom-right panel).30.
To recap, the key to understanding the evolution of the top of the male earnings distribution is to
understand the evolution of the top of the male wage distribution, while the key to understanding the
evolution of the bottom of the earnings distribution is to understand the evolution of hours worked
and the unemployment rate. This evolution of wages and hours at diﬀerent points in the distribution
also explains the rise in the wage-hour correlation. Workers with low wages and low hours worked
relative to the median saw hours decline, while high-wage, high-hours workers experienced wage gains.
Interpretation In a broader macro context, trends in earnings inequality appear to be shaped
by two forces: aggregate labor demand shifts and institutional constraints in the labor market (unions,
the minimum wage). At the top of the earnings distribution—where wages drive earnings dynamics—
institutional constraints are largely absent, and hence labor demand shifts in favor of skilled workers
increase both wage and earnings inequality. Consistently with this interpretation, we note that the
pattern for the college–high school premium (Figure 5) is similar to that for the P90–P50 wage ratio
(Figure 4), suggesting that increasing demand for educated labor is a major factor widening inequality
at the top.
For lower-skilled workers, unions and minimum wage laws deﬂect some of the impact of declining
labor demand from prices (wages) to quantities (hours). In the 1970s, when these institutions were
particularly strong, declining aggregate demand (the “TFP slowdown”) and declining relative demand
for unskilled labor (skill-biased technical change) translated into a moderate fall in wages, and a sharp
fall in employment for low-skilled men (Figure 7).31 The combined eﬀect was rapid growth in earnings
inequality at the bottom. In the 1980s, unions weakened with the decline of the manufacturing sector,
while the real value of the federal minimum wage was eroded by inﬂation. As these institutional
constraints weakened, the impact of labor demand shocks at the bottom of the distribution shifted
from quantities to prices: wages fell sharply in the 1980s, but hours worked partially recovered,
slowing growth in earnings inequality. In the 1990s, the real minimum wage stabilized, while aggregate
30Murphy and Topel (1987, Table 5) provide evidence supporting the view that the rise of unemployment was dispro-
portionately borne by the low-wage workers. Between the periods 1971–1976 and 1980–1985, the unemployment rate
of high school dropouts rose from 5.5% to 10.3%, that of high-school graduates from 4% to 7.5%, and that of college
graduates from 1.7% to 2.2%.
31Here we present the productivity slowdown and skill-biased demand shifts as two separate phenomena. However,
economists have advanced a common interpretation for both based on learning eﬀects associated to the introduction of
ICT. See Hornstein et al. (2005) and the references therein.









Variance of Log Equiv. Household Earnings
Year







Gini Coefficient of Equiv. Household Earnings
Year







P50−P10 Ratio of Equiv. Household Earnings
Year







P90−P50 Ratio of Equiv. Household Earnings
Year
Figure 8: Various measures of household earnings inequality (CPS)
productivity growth recovered. The net eﬀect was broad stability at the bottom of the wage and
earnings distributions.
4.2 Household-level inequality
We compute all of our household-level measures of dispersion on Sample B, with the additional ex-
clusion of households with non-positive household earnings. Also, since the variance of logs measure
is very sensitive to the presence of realizations close to zero, we also exclude the bottom 0.5% of the
remaining sample as ranked by income, reapplying this trim for each deﬁnition of income we study.
Equivalized household earnings Figure 8 plots four measures of dispersion in household
earnings, where each household’s income is ﬁrst adjusted to a per-adult-equivalent basis using the
OECD equivalence scale.32
The top left and bottom left panels plot, respectively, the variance of log earnings and the P50–
32The OECD scale assigns a weight of 1.0 to the ﬁrst adult, 0.7 to each additional adult, and 0.5 to each child. In the
PSID, a child is a family member age 17 or younger. In the CPS and the CEX, we deﬁne a child as age 16 or younger.
The original OECD deﬁnition is age 13 or younger.
20P10 ratio. These two series track each other extremely closely, reﬂecting the fact that the logarithmic
function eﬀectively ampliﬁes small earnings values. The variance of household earnings rises rapidly
in the 1970s and early 1980s before stabilizing. Qualitatively, the proﬁle is similar to that for male
earnings in Figure 6.33
The top right and bottom right panels plot the Gini coeﬃcient for household earnings and the
P90–P50 ratio. These two series also closely resemble each other, reﬂecting the sensitivity of the Gini
coeﬃcient to the shape of the upper portion of the earnings distribution. Inequality at the top of the
household earnings distribution increases steadily across the entire sample period. However, when we
compare the evolution of the P90–P50 and P50–P10 ratios, it is clear that while the growth in the
former is more continuous, it is much smaller in overall magnitude.
Equivalization and residual dispersion in household earnings Equivalization slightly
reduces the level, but has no impact on the trend of the variance, which increases by roughly 30
log points until the early 1990s and then levels oﬀ. Thus, henceforth we will focus on dispersion
in equivalized income measures. Household demographic characteristics explain about 40% of the
variance of household earnings. Consistently with what we observed for wages, growth in residual
earnings dispersion accounts for most of the increase in the raw variance.
Cyclical dynamics of earnings inequality Figure 9 plots the trends in percentiles at diﬀerent
points in the distribution for household earnings (all normalized to zero in 1967), together with shaded
areas denoting NBER-dated recessions. The panel shows clearly the fanning out of the distribution
over time. Although the top 5% of the distribution have seen household earnings rise in real terms by
around 60 log points over the sample period, those below the 10th percentile earned no more in 2005
than in 1970.
Earnings inequality tends to widen sharply in recessions, and then remains relatively stable during
periods of expansion.34 This reﬂects the fact that while household earnings are procyclical at each
percentile, business cycle ﬂuctuations are much more severe at the bottom of the distribution, with
large percentage declines in earnings during recessions. Indeed, the 5th and 10th earnings percentiles
closely mirror—inversely—the time path for the unemployment rate over the sample period.35
33The diﬀerence between the two series primarily reﬂects the fact that in Figure 6 we plot the variance of male
earnings for men working at least 260 hours, whereas in Figure 8 there is no explicit selection on hours. Without this
hours restriction, the variance of male earnings is essentially ﬂat after the mid-1980s, just like the variance of equivalized
household earnings.
34Barlevy and Tsiddon (2006) develop a theoretical model in which recessions amplify long-run trends in inequality.
35The troughs of the low-end percentiles in 1971, 1975, 1982, 1993, and 2004 correspond almost exactly to turning
points in the unemployment rate in 1971, 1975, 1982, 1992, and 2003.

















































Figure 9: Percentiles of the household earnings distribution (CPS). Shaded areas are NBER recessions.
Henceforth, we focus exclusively on the variance of log and the Gini coeﬃcient as measures of
dispersion, exploiting our ﬁnding from Figure 8 that these capture, respectively, the dynamics of
dispersion at the bottom and the top of the income distribution.
From individual to household inequality The top two panels of Figure 10 plot the evolution
of inequality in labor earnings for the main earner and for total household earnings. A marked
diﬀerence between the two measures of income is apparent when dispersion is measured by the Gini
coeﬃcient, but not in the corresponding series for the variance of log earnings.
The dynamics of the Gini coeﬃcient illustrate that the family plays a role in providing insurance
against individual risk—a role that has grown over time, thanks to the surge in female labor supply (see
Section 3). The striking similarity between the variances of main-earner and household log earnings
reﬂects the fact that households at the bottom of the earnings distribution tend to be either single
households or married households with only one earner.
The remaining four panels of Figure 10 further explore how the family shapes cross-sectional
inequality.
Consider ﬁrst the middle two panels. Among single households, earnings dispersion is larger
than among married households, conﬁrming that income pooling within married households reduces
inequality (middle left panel). Although 80% of households in our sample were married in 1967, this
share declines steadily over time to less than 60% in 2005 (middle right panel). This trend tends to
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Figure 10: Understanding the role of the family for earnings inequality (CPS)
increase overall cross-sectional dispersion, given that earnings are more unequally distributed within
single households. At the same time, however, dispersion within single households is broadly stable
over time, while dispersion within married households is generally rising. The net eﬀect is that the
variance of log household earnings for all households evolves very similarly for the corresponding series
for married households.
The bottom two panels of the ﬁgure illustrate two key trends that determine how income pooling
within married households translates into inequality in married household earnings. First, due to
increasing female labor force participation, a rising fraction of married couples contain two earners
(lower left panel), which reduces cross-household dispersion to the extent that earnings are imperfectly
correlated across spouses. Second, among married two-earner households, the between-spouse corre-
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Figure 11: From household earnings to pre-government income (CPS)
lation of earnings has almost doubled (lower right panel), which works in the opposite direction.36
Private transfers and asset income In Figure 11 we move beyond earnings to broader
measures of income. It is important to keep two things in mind. First, our focus is on households
containing at least one adult of working age. Thus, we exclude many older households, which rely
primarily on unearned income. Second, most categories of unearned income suﬀer from serious under-
reporting in the March CPS and in other household surveys (see Section 3).
With these important caveats in mind, we note that adding private transfers reduces income
inequality mostly at the bottom. In part, this reﬂects the fact that households containing retirees
tend to have lower earnings but higher private retirement income. Adding asset income has little
impact on the variance of log income, except for increasing inequality slightly toward the end of the
sample period. In contrast, including asset income markedly increases the Gini coeﬃcient for income.
This reﬂects the well-known fact that a large fraction of aggregate wealth is concentrated at the top
36Fitzgerald (2008) provides an analysis of income dynamics for all sorts of household types and also describes how
the mix of diﬀerent types has changed over time.
















































Figure 12: From pre-government to disposable income (CPS)
of the wealth distribution, and that wealth and income are positively correlated in cross section.37
Government redistribution In Figure 12 we analyze the role of transfers and taxes. Public
transfers play a very important role in compressing inequality at the bottom of the income distribution,
as is evident from the wide gap between the pre-government and pre-tax series for the variance of log
income. Public transfers distributed through the unemployment insurance and welfare system also
serve as a powerful stabilizing antidote to countercyclical surges in pre-government income inequality.
This is evident from the fact that the variance of log household income is much smoother when beneﬁts
are included (top left panel).
The tax code also appears to be quite progressive overall. Disposable income inequality is much
smaller than pre-tax income inequality, for both measures of dispersion.
37Our analysis of SCF data (see Section 8) based on a sample comparable to that of the CPS shows that in 2004 the
Gini coeﬃcient for net worth was 0.70, and the top quintile of the earnings distribution accounted for 52% of aggregate
net worth. Budr´ ıa Rodr´ ıguez et al. (2002) report a correlation between income and wealth of 0.6.








































Figure 13: From disposable income to consumption (CEX)
In the 1980s, pre-tax and post-tax income follow very similar trends. In the 1990s, by contrast,
the gap between pre- and post-tax income inequality rises. These trends are consistent with the view
that the taxes became less progressive under Reagan (1981–1989) and more progressive under Clinton
(1993–2001). Piketty and Saez (2006) report that federal tax rates declined sharply at the top of the
income distribution in the 1980s, and then increased somewhat in the 1990s (see their Table 2).38
Finally, we should note that there are changes over time in the relative importance of transfers
versus taxes in reducing income inequality. For example, in the mid-1990s there was a decline in
the redistributive role of public transfers, following the PRWORA Act of 1996, which dramatically
reduced cash assistance to the poor. At the same time, however, there was a tremendous expansion in
assistance through taxes: the Earned Income Tax Credit more than tripled in the 1990s (see Hoynes,
2008). This shift in redistribution from transfers to taxes over the 1990s is visible in the top left and
bottom left panels of Figure 12.
From income to consumption inequality Figure 13 documents the evolution of inequality
in equivalized disposable income and non-durable consumption expenditures across households in the
38The eﬀective tax rates reported in the Congressional Budget Oﬃce Study (2005) are also consistent with this view.
26United States.39 Both series are computed from the CEX (Sample B). The comparison of these two
series highlights the role of borrowing and lending as a device for consumption smoothing in the face
of income ﬂuctuations. Note that the variance of log disposable income displays a larger increase over
time in the CEX than in the CPS or the PSID. This discrepancy is due to diﬀerences across surveys
in the way taxes are computed. See Section 6 for more on this topic.
The top two panels of Figure 13 show two interesting facts about the relationship between dispos-
able income and consumption inequality. First, consistent with standard economic theory, consump-
tion inequality is substantially lower than income inequality.
Second, the rise in consumption inequality is much smaller than the rise in disposable income
inequality. For example, the respective cumulative increases in the variance are 6 and 18 log points.
This ﬁnding mirrors the conclusion of several recent papers including Slesnick (2001), Krueger and
Perri (2006), and Attanasio et al. (2007), and suggests that some part of income inequality is eﬀec-
tively insurable and/or predictable in nature. Interestingly, in the last years of the sample period,
consumption seem to track income more closely.
The bottom two panels of Figure 13 indicate less transmission of income diﬀerentials into con-
sumption inequality at the bottom of the income distribution than at the top. A possible explanation
for this ﬁnding is that temporary shocks, which do not fully translate into consumption (e.g., short
unemployment spells), are more likely to aﬀect the distribution below the median.
5 Inequality over the life cycle
In the previous section, we argued that a sizable fraction of income diﬀerentials are essentially insur-
able, i.e., they do not translate into consumption. As originally emphasized by Deaton and Paxson
(1994), the age proﬁles for inequality in earnings, income, and consumption contain information about
the nature of risk and insurance when organized within life-cycle models with heterogeneous agents
and incomplete markets (see also Storesletten et al., 2004a; Guvenen, 2007; Huggett et al., 2008;
Kaplan, 2008; Kaplan and Violante, 2008; Heathcote et al., 2009).
However, isolating a pure age proﬁle from repeated cross sections in a non-stationary environment
39We use this narrow deﬁnition of consumption expenditures (which excludes durables) for three reasons. First, it is
consistent with the deﬁnition used in the other articles in this volume. Second, the construction of ﬂow services from
durables and owner-occupied housing is challenging. Third, adding services from housing to consumption would also
require, for consistency, adding imputed rents to the income of home owners. But this would change our deﬁnition of
income relative to the CPS and PSID, where imputed rents are not available. We obtained very similar ﬁndings using
a broader deﬁnition of consumption including purchases of small durables (e.g., home durables, furniture, electronics),
imputed services from vehicles, rents, and imputed rents for home owners. Results and details of the imputation procedure
are available upon request.
27is challenging, because age, time, and cohort are linearly dependent (cohort is time minus age). Here,
we do not attempt to argue whether the source of rising inequality in the United States is better
characterized through time or cohort eﬀects (for a discussion, see Heathcote et al., 2005; Pistaferri,
2009). We simply report two sets of estimates for the evolution of dispersion by age. The ﬁrst set
controls for time eﬀects, the second set for cohort eﬀects.
More speciﬁcally, let ma,c,t be a cross-sectional moment of interest (e.g., the variance of log earn-
ings) for the group of households with head of age a belonging to cohort c (hence, observed at date
t = c + a). To isolate the age proﬁle, we run the two alternative regressions
ma,c,t = β′
aDa + β′




where Dt,Dc, and Da are vectors with entries corresponding to a full set of year, cohort, and age
dummies, respectively. The vectors βt, βc and βa are the corresponding coeﬃcients. The left panels
in Figure 14 plot the estimated values for βa from the ﬁrst regression, where we control for year eﬀects,
and the right panels plot the estimated values for βa from the second regression, where we control for
cohort eﬀects.
Another important issue in documenting the evolution of household inequality over the life cycle is
that the distribution over household size changes with age. We therefore report both inequality in raw
household-level variables, without adjusting for size, and in equivalized household income, where we
use the OECD equivalence scale to express earnings, income, and consumption in per-adult-equivalent
units.40
To allow for a straightforward comparison of how inequality in earnings, income, and consumption
evolve with age, all the series plotted in Figure 14 are based on Sample B from the CEX. Because the
CEX sample is relatively small, rather than estimating a full set of age dummies, we group observations
in 5-year age groups. The series are normalized so that each starts at zero at age 27, which is the
midpoint of the ﬁrst 5-year age group (25–29).
The ﬁgure shows that the variance of log household earnings rises over the life cycle by more than
the variance of disposable income, which in turn rises by more than the variance of log consumption.
40An alternative way to equivalize is to regress household earnings (or income or consumption) on household char-
acteristics (e.g., number of adults, number of children) and to use the predicted values for each household type as the
scaling factors. Often, regression-based equivalence scales diﬀer dramatically from the OECD scale we use. For example,
the OECD treats additional children as enlarging the eﬀective household size (reducing per-equivalent earnings), while
according to the regression, additional children predict lower earnings and thus reduce eﬀective family size. Aguiar and
Hurst (2009) use the regression approach to estimate life-cycle growth in the variance of log non-durable consumption.
When they control for cohort eﬀects (their Figure 1b), they ﬁnd an increase of 12 points between ages 25 and 60, which
is roughly twice as large as our increase (bottom right panel of Figure 14).
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Figure 14: Life-cycle inequality: controlling for time and cohort eﬀects (CEX)
The fact that dispersion in consumption grows less rapidly than dispersion in income indicates that
households are able to eﬀectively insure some fraction of persistent income ﬂuctuations.
Cohort vs. time The precise magnitudes of the life-cycle increases in inequality are sensitive
to whether one controls for year or cohort eﬀects. For example, the variance of log disposable income
rises twice as fast under the cohort view (the right panels) than under the time view (the left panels).41
If one takes the pure cohort view, cross-sectional inequality can increase only if each successive
cohort starts out with more unequal income. If one takes the pure time view, cross-sectional inequality
can increase only if all cohorts see faster growth in within-cohort inequality. The right panels of Figure
14 indicate that over this period, within-cohort disposable income inequality was rising rapidly, while
the left panels attribute much of this rise to a general increase in income inequality over time.
41Why is the life-cycle proﬁle for income so sensitive to whether one adopts the time or cohort view, while the earnings
and consumption proﬁles look more similar? Recall from Figure 12 that the cross-sectional variances of log earnings and
log consumption are relatively stable over time in the CEX, while the variance of disposable income shows a marked
increase. Thus, whether non-stationarity is modeled through year or cohort eﬀects should have relatively little impact
on the implied age proﬁles for earnings or consumption inequality, whereas more is at stake in deciding whether to model
rising income inequality through time or cohort eﬀects.
29Equivalizing Although equivalizing had no impact on trends in our time-series analysis of
inequality (see Section 4.2), the size of the life-cycle growth in dispersion is sensitive to whether or
not one focuses on raw or equivalized measures. Equivalizing reduces the estimated life-cycle increases
for inequality for all variables. For example, under the cohort view, the variance of log raw household
consumption rises twice as fast as log equivalized consumption. Equivalizing reduces the overall growth
in inequality primarily by compressing growth in inequality in the middle of the life cycle. In part,
this is because equivalizing has the eﬀect of amplifying income inequality for the youngest households
in our sample, but has less impact on measured inequality for older households. This is consistent
with the tendency of lower-income individuals to marry and have children at younger ages.
Curvature of the proﬁles Finally, the proﬁles for income and consumption inequality over
the life cycle exhibit diﬀerential curvature. The consumption proﬁle is concave: inequality rises until
roughly age 50 and is approximately ﬂat thereafter. The earnings proﬁle is convex, reﬂecting an
acceleration in earnings inequality at older ages.
The concavity in consumption reﬂects the fact that as retirement approaches, the within-cohort
distribution of permanent income stabilizes (see, for example, Storesletten et al., 2004a). Convexity
of the earnings proﬁle has been presented as evidence of “heterogeneous income proﬁles” (Lillard and
Weiss, 1979; Baker, 1997; Guvenen, 2007), since an income process featuring only a unit root, or a
persistent autoregressive component, would induce a linear or concave earnings proﬁle.42 However, it is
important to remember that the life-cycle proﬁle for dispersion in earnings inherits the corresponding
proﬁles for dispersion in wages and hours. Figure 15, discussed in the next section, indicates that the
life-cycle proﬁle for the variance of log wages is actually slightly concave, and that the convexity of
the earnings proﬁle reﬂects increasing dispersion in hours worked at older ages, as individuals begin
the transition to retirement.
To conclude, our study of life cycle inequality shows that the magnitude of growth in dispersion
over the life-cycle is sensitive to two choices: (i) whether to control for non-stationarity via cohort
or time eﬀects, and (ii) the equivalence scale used to control for life-cycle changes in family size.
More research should be devoted to disentangling cohort versus time eﬀects, and to providing ﬁrmer
theoretical foundations for the choice of household equivalence scale.
42See Guvenen (2007) for a formal explanation of why the model with heterogeneous income proﬁles can generate
convexity in the variance of earnings over the life cycle.
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Figure 15: Comparing life-cycle inequality across data sets
6 Comparison across data sets
In an ideal world, we could use a unique longitudinal household survey to track the joint dynamics of
income, hours, consumption, net saving, and wealth. Unfortunately, no such data set exists for the
United States.43 The best one can do, with US data, is to combine diﬀerent surveys. Therefore, it is
paramount that diﬀerent surveys yield similar patterns for the overlapping variables. In this section,
we brieﬂy assess the comparability of the CPS, the PSID, and the CEX.
Life cycle Figures 15 compares the evolution of inequality over the life cycle across our CPS,
PSID and CEX samples. For all variables —head wage, head hours, raw household earnings, and
OECD-equivalized household earnings—we ﬁnd very close alignment across the three data sets. As
discussed above, the life cycle proﬁle for the variance of log wages is concave, but the dramatic U-shape
in the variance of log hours translates into a convex proﬁle for the variance of log household earnings.
Figure 15 plots age proﬁles controlling for year eﬀects (see Section 5).44 We also computed the same
43See Krueger and Perri (2009) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2009, this volume) for studies along these lines using the
Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth.
44For the large CPS sample we estimated a full set of age dummies, rather than grouping observations in 5-year age
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Figure 16: Comparing the evolution of variances across data sets
series under the cohort view, and once again found a remarkable degree of cohesion across data sets.
Time series for averages With respect to per capita averages, we have veriﬁed that both
the levels and the trends of per capita income in the CPS and the PSID are very similar. CEX per
capita income is roughly 15% lower on average, but it grows at a similar rate, except for the post-2000
period, when it grows somewhat faster.
Time series for inequality Figures 16 and 17 compare the evolution of inequality in male
wages and hours, and in equivalized household earnings and disposable income across our three data
sets. Figure 16 shows inequality measured as variance of log, while Figure 17 plots Gini coeﬃcients.
The top two panels of these two ﬁgures indicate broad agreement across data sets regarding in-
equality in wages and hours, at both ends of their respective distributions. The proﬁles for male wages
in the CPS and the PSID align especially closely. The overall trends for male wages in the CEX are
groups.
32similar, but the CEX series is more volatile and indicates a more rapid increase in both the variance
of log wages and the Gini coeﬃcient for wages in the early 1980s. Compared to the CPS, the variance
of log male hours is slightly lower in the PSID, and slightly higher in the CEX, though the cyclical
ﬂuctuations are remarkably similar in all three series.
A debate has developed recently on whether the rise in US wage inequality was mostly an episodic
event of the 1980s, which plateaued by the end of the decade and never recurred (Card and DiNardo,
2002; Lemieux, 2006) or, rather, a long-term trend toward more wage inequality that started in the
1970s and is still ongoing (Autor et al., 2008). Interestingly, we ﬁnd that both the PSID and the CEX
give support to the “long-run” view.45 Moreover, after 2000 one observes renewed growth in inequality
at the bottom of the wage distribution in all three data sets. In line with our ﬁndings, Piketty and
Saez (2003) use Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data to document that the top percentile wage shares
started increasing in the early 1970s.
The bottom left panels of Figures 16 and 17 plot our two measures of dispersion for equivalized
household earnings. Across the three data sets, the Gini coeﬃcients track each other very closely
through the entire sample period. The variance of log earnings in the CPS and CEX also line up closely
over the 1980–2005 period, where both are available. However, the same panel shows a noticeable
diﬀerence in the 1970s between the CPS and the PSID: the variance of household earnings in the CPS
rises rapidly, while the corresponding series for the PSID is quite ﬂat. We return to this issue below.
The series for dispersion in disposable income plotted in the bottom right panels of Figures 16
and 17 show remarkable agreement in terms of levels and time trends for the CPS and the PSID.
In contrast, inequality in disposable income in the CEX increases more rapidly than in the CPS or
the PSID, especially when measured in terms of the variance of log income. In the CPS and the
PSID taxes are imputed: the CPS has an internal imputation procedure, while for the PSID we used
TAXSIM (see the Appendix for more details). In the CEX, in contrast, taxes are self-reported. This
diﬀerential treatment of taxes accounts for the discrepancy between the CEX and the other data sets:
the variance of pre-tax income in the CEX (not plotted) closely tracks the corresponding series in the
CPS and the PSID. Moreover, when we applied TAXSIM to the CEX to generate alternative estimates
for taxes, we found that CEX disposable income aligns closely with the corresponding CPS and PSID
series. Absent IRS data on actual taxes paid, it remains an open question whether imputed taxes or
45The “episodic” interpretation of widening wage dispersion is based on the May Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG)
CPS sample, which has point-in-time measures of usual hourly wages. Our measures of hourly wages in the PSID and
the CEX are constructed as annual earnings divided by hours worked last year, as in the March CPS.
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Figure 17: Comparing the evolution of Ginis across data sets
self-reported taxes are a more accurate measure of households’ true tax burdens.46
We conclude that comparing these data sets is a very useful exercise for students of inequality.
The close alignment we ﬁnd across the CPS and the CEX with respect to wages and earnings should
give researchers more conﬁdence when integrating CPS wage/earnings data and CEX consumption
data. The close alignment we ﬁnd with respect to wages across the CPS and the PSID should give
researchers more conﬁdence that models for wage dynamics estimated from the PSID panel data are
consistent with the evolution of cross-sectional wage dispersion in the much larger CPS sample.
Variance of earnings: CPS versus PSID The only striking discrepancy across data sets
that we detect is the sharp increase in the variance of CPS household earnings in the 1970s, which is
not apparent in the PSID. At a mechanical level, the diﬀerence can be attributed to the fact that over
the period 1967–1982, the PSID reveals a much smaller drop in male and household earnings at the
46In the context of our study, one reason to prefer the self-reported measure is that we have used self-reporting for
virtually every other variable.
34very bottom of their respective distributions (above the second decile of the distribution, household
earnings in the CPS and PSID track each other closely). Male earnings decline by less in the PSID
because male hours decline by less.
To understand why the bottom of the PSID earnings distribution evolves diﬀerently from the
other data sets, recall that the PSID was designed to be representative of the US population in 1967,
and in subsequent years has tracked the original families and their descendants. The PSID is likely
to be imperfectly representative in later years for two reasons. First, the basic SRC sample under-
represents recent immigrants, since by deﬁnition immigrants cannot be descendants of the original
sample. Second, over the years there has been signiﬁcant cumulative attrition from the original
sample: over 50% by 1988. Fitzgerald et al. (1998) report that attritors are disproportionately non-
white, older, and less educated. They are less likely to be married, and more likely to rent and to
receive welfare. Attritors also work less and earn less, and have more volatile income.
Thus, it seems likely that the PSID is imperfectly representative of the bottom of the earnings and
income distributions, and that this problem may have grown over time as the shares of non-white and
non-married individuals in the CPS and CEX have grown more rapidly than in the PSID (see Table
2). Another reason to suspect that the PSID understates the declines in individual earnings in the
lowest percentiles of the earnings distribution in the 1967–1982 period is that a decline in earnings
(e.g., unemployment) increases the probability of attriting: thus attrition is particularly problematic
during a period of rising unemployment and labor market instability.47
7 Income dynamics
In labor economics, there is a long tradition of estimating structural models of income dynamics
from panel data (starting from Lillard and Willis, 1978; Lillard and Weiss, 1979; MaCurdy, 1982).
These models have recently been adopted by quantitative macroeconomists as a key ingredient in
the calibration and estimation of heterogeneous-agent incomplete-markets models (e.g., Imrohoroglu,
1989; Huggett, 1993; Aiyagari, 1994; R´ ıos-Rull, 1995).
In this section, we use the panel data from the PSID over the 1967–2002 period (Sample C) to
estimate the dynamics of individual wages in the United States. We choose to focus on log hourly
wage dynamics, since wages are the most primitive (i.e., closest to being exogenous) among the various
income measures we analyze. We restrict attention to heads of households, since endogenous selection
47Because the PSID under-represents those with low or zero earnings, it under-estimates poverty. The empirical
literature on poverty consistently ﬁnds that poverty rates are lower in the PSID than in the March CPS (see, for
example, Duncan and Rodgers, 1991, Figure 1).
35into work undermines the estimation of wage dynamics for the secondary earner.
As is common in the literature, we focus on “residual” dispersion, i.e., log wage residuals from a
standard Mincerian regression with the same speciﬁcation chosen for Figure 5, run separately year by
year. The variance of residual wage inequality grows by about 14 log points between 1967 and 2000
in the PSID, a rise very similar in size to that documented in Figure 5 using CPS data. Given this
upward trend, the statistical model is estimated non-parametrically to allow for non-stationarity, a
standard approach in this literature since Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (1994).
Statistical model Let wi,c,t be the residual log hourly wage for individual i of cohort c at
date t. We estimate a permanent-transitory (PT) model of the form
wi,c,t = zi,c,t + εi,c,t (2)
zi,c,t = zi,c,t−1 + ηi,c,t,
where εi,c,t and ηi,c,t are innovations that are uncorrelated over time, i.i.d. across individuals, and
orthogonal to each other. Let σε,t and ση,t denote the variances of the two shocks. As the notation
suggests, these conditional variances are time-varying, but do not depend on cohort.48
Methodology The literature has followed two alternative approaches to estimating income
processes. The ﬁrst, common in labor economics (e.g., Abowd and Card, 1989; Meghir and Pistaferri,
2004; Blundell et al., 2008), uses moments based on income growth rates—or ﬁrst-diﬀerences in log
income. The second, more common in macroeconomic applications (e.g., Storesletten et al., 2004b;
Guvenen, 2007; Heathcote et al., 2008), uses moments in log income levels. Although either approach
can be used to estimate the permanent-transitory model described above, they diﬀer with respect to
the set of moments that identify the structural parameters {σε,t,ση,t}.
In this section, we report estimates based on both methodologies. Exploiting PSID data until the
most recent waves is challenging since after 1996 (survey year 1997), the data frequency goes from
annual to biannual. Throughout, we use only moments that can be computed in biannual data. This
makes estimates for the latter part of the sample, where wages are only observed at two-year intervals,
entirely consistent with estimates from the ﬁrst part of the sample, when workers were reinterviewed
every year.
Let ∆2wi,c,t = wi,c,t − wi,c,t−2 = ηi,c,t + ηi,c,t−1 + εi,c,t − εi,c,t−2. In diﬀerences, the permanent-
48In general, the model allows for cohort-speciﬁc variances of the initial condition z0. However, the estimation methods
we implement below are based on moments that do not identify cohort-speciﬁc initial variances.










= ση,t + ση,t−1 + σε,t + σε,t−2 (4)
The ﬁrst set of moments (3) identiﬁes σε,t for t = 1969,...,1994,1996,1998,2000. Then, given estimates
for σε,t, the second set of moments (4) identiﬁes ση,t + ση,t−1 for t = 1971,...,1994,1996,1998,2000.
In levels, the same model is estimated based on the following within-cohort moment restrictions:
varc (wi,c,t) − covc (wi,c,t+2,wi,c,t) = σε,t (5)
varc (wi,c,t) − covc (wi,c,t,wi,c,t−2) = ση,t + ση,t−1 + σε,t (6)
The ﬁrst set of moments (5) identiﬁes σε,t for t = 1967,...,1994,1996,1998,2000. Then, given estimates
for σε,t, the second set of moments (6) identiﬁes ση,t +ση,t−1 for t = 1969,...,1994,1996,1998,2000.49
Under the true model, none of the above moments (in levels or diﬀerences) depend on cohort, c.
We therefore estimate variances at date t by averaging across all cohorts in the sample at t.50 For
example, to estimate σε,t using moments in levels, we use the moment
X
c∈Ct
[varc (wi,c,t) − covc (wi,c,t+2,wi,c,t)] = σε,t,
where the set Ct includes all cohorts between ages 25 and 60 in t and t+2. Given the set of moments
outlined above, once we pool across cohorts, all parameters are exactly and independently identiﬁed.
Findings The parameter estimates for the permanent-transitory model for wages are plotted
in Figure 18.51 It is immediately obvious that the choice of whether to target moments in diﬀerences
or in levels when estimating the model leads to diverging sets of parameter estimates. The variance of
permanent shocks is three times as large when estimated in diﬀerences, while the variance of transitory
shocks is larger when estimated in levels. We return to this point below.
The overall time trends in the permanent and transitory variances are somewhat more similar
across estimation methods. For example, both sets of estimates suggest that the 1990s was a decade
49By using more moments, one could identify more parameters in the early part of the sample. For example, one could
use the level moment covc(wi,c,t+2,wi,c,t) − covc(wi,c,t+1,wi,c,t−1) or the diﬀerence moment covc(∆wi,c,t+1,∆wi,c,t) to
estimate ση,t year by year over the period when the PSID survey was administered annually. However, because one of
our goals is to examine time trends in the variances of permanent and transitory shocks, we prefer to base our estimation
on the same set of moments throughout the entire sample period, which dictates an identiﬁcation scheme that can be
applied to biannual data. In practice, we ﬁnd that including moments of the type just described has a minimal impact
on estimated levels or trends for permanent or transitory shocks.
50To increase the number of observations per cell, we deﬁne an individual as belonging to “cohort” k if her true cohort
was k−1,k, or k+1. We discard cells/cohorts with less than 100 observations. Using all cells with positive observations
and weighting by the number of observations yields very similar results for the estimation.
51At each date t, the plotted variance of the permanent shock is simply (ση,t + ση,t−1)/2.
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Figure 18: Estimates of the variances of the transitory and permanent components (PSID)
of high transitory uncertainty.52 Overall, both sets of estimates suggest that around half of the
rise of residual wage inequality between 1967 and 2000 was transitory in nature. The ﬁnding that a
signiﬁcant fraction of the overall increase in wage inequality was transitory (and hence easily insurable)
is consistent with the ﬁnding documented in Figure 13 that inequality in consumption rose by less
than inequality in income over this period.
We now return to the substantial divergence between the average transitory and permanent vari-
ances obtained when using the two sets of moments. This strong disagreement indicates that the
permanent-transitory model is misspeciﬁed: this model, an “industry-standard,”cannot simultane-
ously replicate moments of the wage distribution in levels and moments in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Interest-
ingly, several papers in this issue that estimate the same model on longitudinal data for other countries
reach the same conclusion (e.g., Domeij and Floden, 2009, for Sweden; Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln et al., 2009,
for Germany; Brzozowski et al., 2009, for Canada).
Misspeciﬁcation is a serious concern because diﬀerent estimation approaches give very diﬀerent
estimates for the variance of permanent wage shocks. A large quantitative theoretical literature
indicates that precisely this variance is a key determinant of the welfare costs of incomplete insurance
52In survey year 1993, the PSID shifted from manual to computer-assisted telephone interviewing. This change in
methodology is often associated to a temporary increase in measurement error. Even though the values for the transitory
variance in calendar year 1992–1993 may be artiﬁcially inﬂated, the fact that the transitory variance remains high suggests
the rise in the 1990s is genuine. See Kim and Staﬀord (2000) for more details.
38against idiosyncratic risk, and thus of the potential welfare gains from social insurance policies.
One sensible “reality check” for any variance estimate is what it implies for the growth of wage
inequality over the life cycle. Figure 14 suggests that the estimate for the permanent variance based
on moments in ﬁrst diﬀerences (0.027 on average) is implausibly high. This estimate implies a rise
in the variance of log wages of 0.94 over the 35 years of working life from age 25 to 60, vis-` a-vis the
observed increase of 0.35 (0.20) when controlling for cohort (time) eﬀects.53 When estimated using
moments in levels, instead, the average value for the variance of permanent shocks is 0.007, implying a
realistic life cycle increase of 0.25 over 35 years.54 However, in some years, the levels-based estimates
for the variance of permanent shocks are negative—another indication of misspeciﬁcation.
To sum up, the key challenge for future work is to develop a speciﬁcation for the wage process that
is both parsimonious enough to be used as an input to incomplete-markets models, and rich enough
to account empirically for the covariance structure of wages in both levels and diﬀerences.
8 An exploratory look at wealth
In this section, we explore the dynamics of wealth inequality through the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), the best source of micro-level data on household-level assets and liabilities for the United States.
The SCF is a triennial survey of US households managed by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. The survey collects information on income (for the year preceding the survey) but
focuses primarily on detailed information about household ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial assets, debts,
and capital gains. The SCF survey has two parts: a standard random sample of US households, and
a second sample that focuses on wealthy households, identiﬁed on the basis of tax returns. The SCF
provides weights for combining the two samples. In the 2007 survey 4,422 households were sampled.
We exclude the 1986 survey, which was a condensed reinterview of respondents to the 1983 survey.55
One diﬀerence between the SCF weighting scheme and the weights provided in the CPS and CEX
is that the SCF weights are designed to correct for diﬀerential non-response rates by wealth. Because
non-response is more common for wealthier households, the SCF tends to deliver higher estimates for
53When we trimmed the top and bottom 3% of the empirical distribution of log wage diﬀerences, we obtain a variance
of permanent shocks of roughly the same size (and showing a similar trend) as the estimate in levels. However, the
implied variance of transitory shocks is then less than one-third of its counterpart in levels. More generally, it is unclear
whether trimming eliminates genuine wage variation or spurious outliers.
54An alternative strategy that is also able to replicate the growth of inequality over the life cycle is using moments
based on log diﬀerences between dates t and t+q+1, with q large enough (see Carroll, 1992). This strategy is also robust
against misspeciﬁcation caused by the presence of a MA(q) component in the true model. Carroll’s point estimate for
the permanent variance of head labor earnings is 0.011 for the period 1967–1985, a value closer to our estimate in levels.
For details, see Appendix A of his paper.
55For more details on the SCF, see Bucks et al. (2009), or Budr´ ıa Rodr´ ıguez et al. (2002).
39average income relative to other surveys, in which the very wealthy are likely to be under-represented.
To make the SCF sample more consistent with our other samples, we drop some of the highest net
worth households in the SCF, choosing the fraction to drop so that mean pre-tax household income in
the remaining 2007 SCF sample is equal to mean income in the 2007 CPS. This translates to dropping
1.47% of weighted observations in each year, which corresponds to 17.6% of unweighted observations
in 2007 (because wealthy households are over-sampled, they are down-weighted in the SCF weighting
scheme).
After this ﬁrst step to align the raw SCF with the CPS, we apply the same basic sample selection
criteria to the top-trimmed SCF as to the other data sets. In particular, we focus on households in
which there is at least one adult of working age, and we drop households in which there are workers
whose wage is below half the federal minimum. We then construct our preferred measure of earnings:
wage and salary income plus two-thirds of business and farm income. Our measure of a household’s
net worth includes all its ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial assets (except the value of deﬁned-beneﬁt pension
plans and claims to social security) minus all its debts. As with the other data sets, we equivalize
both household earnings and household net worth using the OECD scale, and then trim the bottom
0.5% of equivalized observations before computing the measures of dispersion.
Dropping the top 1.47% of the net worth distribution has a signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrst and second
moments of the distributions for earnings, pre-tax income, and net worth. In the trimmed sample,
mean net worth is only 64% of mean net worth in the untrimmed sample (averaged across SCF
surveys). The corresponding ﬁgures for earnings and pre-tax income are 91% and 88%. The average
net worth to income ratio, a key input in the calibration in many macro models, is 4.5 in the untrimmed
data, but only 3.3 in the trimmed data. Trimming also has a large impact on wealth inequality. The
average Gini coeﬃcient for net worth in the raw data is 0.77 but only 0.68 in the trimmed data. This
is primarily attributable to a sharp decline in wealth concentration at the top: the share of net worth
accounted for by the wealth-richest 1% falls from 33% to 14%. The conclusion we draw is that one
should be very cautious when combining data on inequality in wages and earnings from the CPS or
PSID, and data on inequality in net worth from the SCF. For example, one should not expect a model
calibrated to wage or income dynamics from the PSID to replicate the extreme wealth inequality in
the raw SCF.56
Figure 19 describes the key features of the trimmed SCF data. In the top two panels we compare
inequality in equivalized household earnings to the CPS. Both the variance of log and Gini coeﬃcients
56See also Castaneda et al. (2003) for a discussion of this point.
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Figure 19: Top panels: comparison between earnings inequality in SCF and CPS. Bottom panels:
measures of wealth inequality (SCF)
indicate slightly more inequality in the SCF.57 The SCF series are quite volatile, reﬂecting a relatively
small sample size. To the extent that any trends are discernable in the noisy and intermittent measures
of dispersion for the SCF, they are consistent with those in the CPS over the period when the data
sets overlap: stability in the variance of log earnings, and an increase in the Gini coeﬃcient.
The bottom two panels plot some statistics on wealth inequality in the trimmed sample. The
Gini coeﬃcient for equivalized household net worth has risen by about 5 points since the mid-1990s,
driven by increasing concentration at the top: the richest 10% of households increased their share
of aggregate net worth from 51% to 59% between 1983 and 2007. At the bottom of the net worth
distribution, the fraction of households with negative net worth and the aggregate net debts of the
wealth-poorest 10% of households were lower in the 1980s and higher—but relatively stable—in the
1990s and 2000s.
Several candidate explanatory factors can account for the rise in wealth inequality since the mid-
57Trimming the top of the net worth distribution has very little eﬀect on the level or trend for log equivalized household
earnings in the SCF but reduces the Gini coeﬃcient by 4 points, on average.
411990s. Rising transitory labor market risk (see Section 7) is one possible factor: in heterogeneous-agent
incomplete-markets models, transitory income shocks transmit directly to wealth dispersion. However,
other forces have also been at work. For example, since stock ownership is heavily concentrated among
the rich, a booming stock market in the late 1990s ampliﬁed wealth inequality.58
9 Conclusions
This study sheds light on how a wide range of insurance and redistribution mechanisms operate at
diﬀerent points in the income distribution, and of how their respective roles have changed over the
past 40 years. The importance of these mechanisms is reﬂected in our ﬁnding that both levels and
trends in economic inequality depend crucially on the variable of analysis. Endogenous labor supply
and government redistribution play especially important roles in shaping the dynamics of inequality.
Future research based on structural models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets should
therefore prioritize incorporating these features.
Substantively, we ﬁnd a large and steady increase in wage inequality between 1967 and 2006.
Changes in the distribution of hours worked sharpen the rise in earnings inequality in the ﬁrst half
of the sample, but mitigate rising inequality in the second half. Taxes and transfers compress the
level of income inequality, especially at the bottom of the distribution, but have little overall eﬀect on
the trend. Consumption data suggest that access to ﬁnancial markets has reduced both the level and
growth of economic inequality since 1980.
Because borrowing and lending can more eﬀectively smooth relatively transitory shocks to income,
we estimated a standard permanent-transitory error component model for wage dynamics. We found
that the estimated relative levels of the permanent and transitory variances are very sensitive to
whether target cross-sectional moments are expressed in terms of levels or in growth rates, indicating
model misspeciﬁcation. Nonetheless, for two quite diﬀerent identiﬁcation schemes, our estimates
suggest that a signiﬁcant portion of the change in wage volatility was transitory in nature, and hence
easily insurable through saving. The rise in wealth dispersion we uncover from SCF data is, potentially,
consistent with this mechanism.
We have also identiﬁed several methodological issues that complicate comparisons across diﬀerent
data sets. First, comparing income or consumption data from the CPS, PSID, or CEX to wealth
58The impact of the boom in house prices between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s on overall wealth inequality is less
clear-cut, given that housing is a relatively more important component of net worth for those in the middle of the
net worth distribution than for households in either tail. However, the associated rise in the availability of housing-
collateralized credit presumably allowed home owners to better smooth consumption in response to negative income
shocks (see Favilukis et al., 2009).
42data from the SCF can be misleading because the SCF corrects for higher non-response rates among
wealthier households, whereas the other data sets do not. Second, micro data and the aggregates from
the national accounts do not line up well along two dimensions: per capita consumption in the CEX
displays almost none of the growth in aggregate consumption since 1980, and cyclical ﬂuctuations in
mean pre-tax income in the CPS are twice as large as those in the NIPA. The expansion of business-
cycle analysis to richer models with heterogeneous agents is at the forefront of the research program
in quantitative macroeconomics. Thus, understanding the sources of these divergences is a priority.
A ﬁnal question is, what can be learned from our exercise about the likely distributional impli-
cations of the 2008–2009 recession? We have extended our analysis of the March CPS surveys to
incorporate the survey years up to 2009, imposing the same sample restrictions used throughout the
paper. Between income years 2002 and 2007, inequality in earnings and income is remarkably sta-
ble. Then, between 2007 and 2008, earnings inequality increases signiﬁcantly with the onset of the
recession, especially at the bottom of the distribution: the variance of equivalized household earn-
ings increases by six log points. Inequality in pre-tax income (which includes government transfers
and capital income) rises much less: the variance of log equivalized pre-tax income increases by two
log points. Both the sharp rise in earnings inequality, and the smaller rise in dispersion for broader
measures of income are typical features of past recessions in our sample (see Figures 11 and 12).
History suggests two possible scenarios for the future. A benign prognosis would be something
akin to the the 1991 recession, in which economic growth quickly resumes and the increase in earnings
dispersion is temporary. In this scenario, thanks to government assistance and temporary borrowing,
increased inequality in earnings does not translate into inequality in disposable income and consump-
tion. A perhaps more likely scenario is a repeat of the experience of the early 1980s, in which earnings
declines at the bottom of the distribution are extremely persistent. In this case, as avenues for tem-
porary smoothing are exhausted, a larger fraction of the growth in earnings dispersion will transmit
to disposable income, consumption, and welfare. Moreover, a persistent increase in inequality now
would come at a time when income disparities are already high by historical standards.
Irrespective of the precise pattern of post-recession recovery, dispersion in economic outcomes
across American households will remain orders of magnitude larger than dispersion in aggregate out-




Survey description Each household in the CPS is interviewed once a month for four consecutive
months one year, and again for the corresponding time period a year later: a 4-8-4 rotating panel
design. However, while it is sometimes possible to follow households from one year to the next, it
is not always possible to match records across consecutive years. Thus we ignore the limited panel
dimension to the CPS, and treat it as a pure cross section. Approximately 98,000 housing units were in
sample for the 2007 ASEC (March CPS), of which 83,200 were determined to be eligible for interview,
leading to about 76,100 interviews obtained.
There have been a succession of changes over time in the March CPS involving the sample construc-
tion, interview methods, data processing and imputation methods, weighting (reﬂecting new decennial
Census population counts), and the structure and content of the questions themselves. More detailed
questions about income were asked beginning with the 1976 survey, and the set of questions was
expanded again in 1988.
For March 1988 two ﬁles are available: the regular and the rewrite ﬁle, which includes revised
procedures for weighting and imputations (a previous change to the imputation procedure occurred
in 1976). We use the rewrite ﬁle, which is recommended for comparison with future years. Two ﬁles
are also available for 2001: including or excluding the SCHIP sample expansion. We use the smaller
sample. The largest changes in the basic CPS survey methodology came in 1994, with the introduction
of computer-assisted interviewing, and associated redesign of the questionnaire.
Weights We use the March supplement weights to produce our estimates. We use individual
weights for individual-level variables, and household weights for household-level variables.
Sample selection Our basic sample selection strategy is outlined in the text: here we describe
the details of how this applies to the CPS. To generate our Sample A, the cleaned version of the entire
data set, we start by dropping households that do not have exactly one “reference person”, the person
to whom the relationship of other household members is recorded (there are no such households from
income year 1993 onwards). We then drop households in which there are household members with
negative or zero weights (there are only a handful of such households from 1975 onwards). Next we
drop households in which there are members with positive earnings but zero weeks worked (there are no
such households from 1989 onwards). Next we drop households in which there is an individual whose
hourly wage is less than half the legal minimum in that year. To apply a consistent sample selection
rule across the whole sample period, we deﬁne the hourly wage here using the “hours worked last week
variable”, which is available throughout the sample period (see below). There are no missing values
for variables in the CPS, since missing values are imputed (see below). We do not exclude observations
with imputed values, even if all income variables are imputed. This deﬁnes the basic “NIPA” sample,
Sample A, used for comparison with BEA estimates of income in Figure 1.
Sample B, the starting point for measuring inequality among the population of working age house-
holds, is Sample A less all households in which there are no individuals aged between 25 and 60,
inclusive. Note that the CPS version of Sample B retains households as long as any household mem-
ber falls in the 25-60 age range, even if both the CPS reference person and their spouse fall outside
44the range. The CPS estimates of average hours in Figure 2 use all individuals in Sample B.
The estimates for measures of income inequality in Figures 8-12, 15-17 and 19 are for a subset of
Sample B. In each year, we drop households with zero household earnings. Then, for each diﬀerent
variable of interest (e.g. equivalized pre-tax household income) we trim the lowest 0.5% of observations.
Thus, when we compare inequality across diﬀerent measures of income, the sample of households is
the same for each income concept, except for variation in the identities of the 0.5% of households that
are trimmed.
Hours Recall that we compute an individual’s wage as annual earnings divided by annual hours
worked. To compute hours worked last year, we multiply weeks worked last year (wkslyr) by a measure
of hours worked per week. Up to and including income year 1974 we are forced to use hours worked
last week (hours), while from 1975 onwards a new variable (hrslyr) becomes available which measures
usual hours per week last year. One would expect this latter measure to produce a much more accurate
estimate for an individual’s annual hours, and thus for his annual wage.
We compute hours and wages both ways for the 1975–2005 period. For the hrslyr version, we
drop individuals in Sample A with wages (computed using that measure of hours) below half the
minimum (recall that Sample A already includes a similar screen, but using the other measure of
hours). Reassuringly, we ﬁnd that trends in the variances of hours and wages are very similar across
the two measures over this period, while there is some diﬀerence, unsurprisingly, in levels of inequality:
there is less variance in wages using the better measure. We also ﬁnd a very similar increase in the
correlation between individual hours and individual wages using the two diﬀerent approaches, though
the level of the correlation is much lower using the hours-last-week question, indicating more severe
division bias. For ﬁgures plotting time series moments involving wages and hours, we splice together
the two series.
Prior to 1975 income year, there is a second reason why our measure of hours is of lesser quality,
which is that the March CPS data ﬁles record weeks worked in intervals rather than as speciﬁc integers
(even though the original questionnaires for the 1970–1975 survey years asked for integer responses).
Based on the weeks-worked distributions in income years 1975 forwards, Unicon converts interval codes
into estimates of cell means.
Imputation The CPS is subject to two sources of nonresponse: noninterview households and
item nonresponse. To compensate for the ﬁrst data loss, the weights on noninterviewed households
are distributed among interviewed households. Korinek et al. (2006) suggest an alternative procedure
to deal with noncompliance based on the fact that average income and average nonresponse vary
systematically across states. They ﬁnd that it is high income households who disproportionately do
not respond. While their adjustment raises the level of measured income inequality from the CPS
(the Gini coeﬃcient goes up by 4–5 points), trends are unaﬀected.
The second source is item nonresponse, meaning a respondent either does not know or refuses to
provide the answer to a question. The Census Bureau imputes missing income data using a “hot deck”
procedure which matches individuals with missing observations to others with similar demographic
and economic information who did answer the questions. For example, the weekly earnings hot deck
is deﬁned by age, race, sex, usual hours, occupation and educational attainment. Before any edits are
applied, the data are sorted geographically so that missing values are allocated from geographically
close records.
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for asset income categories. Thus dropping households with imputed values would drastically reduce
the sample size, and call into question the appropriateness of the CPS-provided weights. Response
rates for the CPS are high relative to other large household surveys, but have been declining over
time. Moreover, nonresponse rates are higher for income than for other kinds of questions. Atrostic
and Kalenkoski (2002) report response rates, deﬁned as the percentage of all recipients (reported and
imputed) who also reported an amount for the 1990 March CPS and the 2000 March CPS. Response
rates for earnings from longest job (incer1) fell from 81.2% to 72.4%. Response rates for interest and
dividend income fell from over 70% to below 50%. In terms of the share of income imputed, 26.8%
of total wage and salary earnings, 43.8% of non-farm self-employment income, and 64.1% of interest
and dividend income was imputed in 2000. For a signiﬁcant fraction of households all income items
are imputed.
Top-coding Top-coding is an important issue to address in the CPS, both for computing means,
and for measuring the evolution of inequality at the top of the income distribution. Public top-code
thresholds vary widely across income categories, and across time. An additional problem is that the
Census Bureau’s internal data are also subject to censoring (to economize on computer tape, and
to protect against gross errors). For example, the public use censoring point for the variable incwag
(income from wages and salaries) was $50,000 for the income years 1975–1980, $75,000 for 1981–1983,
and $99,999 for 1984–1986. For the same variable, the internal CPS censoring points were $99,999 for
the period 1975–1984, and $250,000 for 1985–1986.
We deal with top-coded observations by assuming the underlying distribution for each component
of income is Pareto, and follow a suggestion from David Domeij by forecasting the mean value for
top-coded observations by extrapolating a Pareto density ﬁtted to the non-top-coded upper end of
the observed distribution. This procedure automatically takes care of the internal censoring problem,
since the internal threshold always exceeds the public use limit. It also has the advantage that in
principle it adjusts appropriately to changes in top-code thresholds.
We apply this procedure at the most disaggregated decomposition of income possible. Thus, for
example, for each year we divide the set of observations for the variable incer1 (income from primary
source) according to whether or not they are ﬂagged as wage and salary or self-employment, and run
separate regressions on the two sets of observations. This is important for two reasons. First, for any
given individual, while one type of income may be top-coded others will not be. Second, there is more
upper tail concentration in some types of income than others.
Beginning in income year 1995 the CPS started reporting cell means for top-coded observations,
with cells identiﬁed by gender, race, and work experience. This allows us to assess the performance of
the regression procedure. We ﬁnd that the regression approach generally performs very well for most
income categories. It leads us to slightly over-predict income from primary source ﬂagged as wages
and salary over the 1995–2005 income year period, and to slightly under-predict interest income.
Since our primary goal is to measure changes in inequality consistently over time, we use the
regression approach for the primary income variable through the sample period, even when cell means
are available. (Another reason to favor the regression approach is that there are likely errors in the
reported cell means for earnings for the 2000 survey year (1999 income year): the replacement value
for earnings (top-code value $150,000) for male, non-black non-Hispanic full-year full-time workers
46falls from $306,731 in 1999 to $229,340 in 2000, and then rises to $335,115 in 2001. Larrimore et
al. (2008) were granted access to internal CPS data, and report a 2000 cell mean for this group of
$300,974.)
However, at the same time that the Census began reporting cell means, they drastically reduced
public use censoring points for many income categories: the threshold for interest income declined
from $99,999 to $35,000 between income years 1997 and 1998 and to $25,000 in 2002, while the
threshold for dividend income declined from $99,999 to $15,000. We found that when the distribution
is truncated too far to the left, the Pareto-extrapolation procedure does not always perform well. Thus
for income years 1998 to 2005 we use cell means for all income categories, except income from primary
source. Unfortunately, switching from regression-based adjustment to cell means has the eﬀect of
reducing measured concentration at the top of the distribution of asset income. We therefore make
an adjustment in Figure 11 to our post-1998 estimates for Gini coeﬃcients for income categories that
include asset income. The adjustment factor is the ratio of the Gini coeﬃcient in 1997 that emerges
when top-coded observations are adjusted using the regression procedure, and the Gini coeﬃcient for
1997 that emerges when we apply the 1998 top-code thresholds and reported cell means for asset
income to the 1997 data.
Mechanically, the procedure we follow to compute top-coding adjustments is as follows. First,
for a particular income variable, we identify the existence of top-coded observations. Then we sort
observations in ascending order by income. The sample for our least-squares regression is the top
(weighted) decile of non-zero, non-top-coded observations. For each individual i with income wi
we compute the fraction of households in our sample (including top-coded households) with income
greater than wi, which we denote vi. We then regress log(v) on a constant and log(w), and set the
adjustment factor to β/(1 + β), where β is the estimated coeﬃcient on income. For a given income
type in a given year, all top-coded observations are assigned an income value equal to the top-code
threshold times this adjustment factor.
Demographic variables First we note that demographic variables (age, years of education,
etc.) refer to the survey year, while questions about income refer to the previous year. We do not adjust
for this timing discrepancy. Thus, for example, the CPS Sample B for income year 1980 corresponds
to households who in March 1981 reported at least one households member age 25–60. Head If there
are any 25–60 year-old males in the household, the oldest male is the head. If there are no such males,
the oldest 25–60-year-old female is the head. Note that this deﬁnition of head makes no connection to
the identity of the CPS reference person. Education We deﬁne an individual to be college educated if
they have 16 years of schooling or more. Race We divide individuals into those identifying as “white”
and those that do not, who we label “non-white.” Until 1988 the only non-white options were “black”
or “other.” In 1988, American Indian and Asian were added as additional options. In 1996 the “other”
option was dropped. In 2003 many new options were added.
Dispersion related to observables, and residual inequality For the plot of residual dis-
persion in Figure 5, the sample is those households in Sample B in which the head is male, and in which
there are either one or two adults age 25–60. The independent variables for the two-adult households
are: 3 race dummies (white-white, non-white-non-white, mixed-race), 2 sex dummies (male-female,
male-male), 4 education dummies (college-college, college-non-coll, non-coll-college, non-coll-non-coll),
average years of education for all adults, a quadratic in age (actual age minus 25) for the head, a
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above age 60. The independent variables for the one-adult households are analogous.
Income measures Over our sample period there have been two important changes in the set of
income questions asked in the March CPS, one beginning in the 1975 income year, and a second in the
1987 income year. However, these changes appear to have a negligible impact on either total income,
or its division between diﬀerent classes of income. The exception to this is for private transfers, which
increases from 1.9% of pre-tax income in 1974 to 3.5% in 1975 (where these ﬁgures apply to Sample
A).
Labor Income 1967-1986 = incwag, 1987-2005 = incer1 (if ernsrc=1 (wage and salary)) + incwg1,
where incwag = income from wage and salary; incer1 = earnings from longest job before deductions;
incwg1 = income from other wage and salary
Self Employment Income 1967-1986 = incse + incfrm, 1987-2005 = incer1 (if ernsrc=2 or 3 (farm or
non-farm self-employment)) + incse1 + incfr1, where incse = income from non-farm self-employment;
incfrm = income from farm or nonincorporated self-employment; inse1 = income from other work –
own business self-employment; incfr1 = income from other work – farm self-employment
Earnings = labor income + 2/3 self-employment income
Private Transfers 1967-1974 = incoth, 1975-1986 = incret + incalc + incoth, 1987-2005 = incoth
+ incalm + inchld + incds1 + incds2 + incont + incrt1 + incrt2 + incsi1 + incsi2, where incoth =
income from other sources; incret = income from retirement funds; incalc = income from alimony and
child support; incalm = income from alimony; inchld = income from child support; incds1 = income
from disability income – primary source; incds2 = income from disability income – secondary source;
incont = income from contributions, assistance from friends; incrt1 = income from retirement income
– primary source; incrt2 = income from retirement income – secondary source; incsi1 = income from
survivors income – primary source; incsi2 = income from survivors income - secondary source
Earnings Plus = earnings + private transfers
Net Asset Income 1967-1974 = incint, 1975-1986 = incint + incdiv, 1987-2005 = incint + incdv2
+ incrnt, where incint = income from interest, dividends and net rentals; incdiv = income from
dividends, rents and trusts; incdv2 = income from dividends; incrnt = income from rent
Pre-Government Income = earnings plus + net asset income
Public Transfers 1967-1974 = incpa + incomp + incss, 1975-1986 = incpa + incomp + incss
+ incsec, 1987-2005 = incpa + incss + incsec + inced + incvet + incwcp + incuc, where incpa =
income from public assistance or welfare; incomp = income from unemplymt/workers comp/veterans
payments/govt pensions; incss = income from social security or railroad retirement – from US govt;
incsec = income from supplemental security; inced = income from educational assistance; incvet =
income from veterans payments; incwcp = income from worker’s compensation; incuc = income from
unemployment compensation
Pre-Tax Income = pre-government income + public transfers
Taxes (imputed) 1979-2005 = fedtaxbc + statetaxbc + ﬁca - eitcrd, where fedtaxbc = federal
income tax liability, before credits; statetaxbc = state income tax liability, before credits; ﬁca = social
security retirement payroll deduction; eitcrd = earned income tax credit
Disposable Income = pre-tax income - taxes
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Deﬁnition of “head” The head of the family unit (FU) must be at least 16 years old, and the
person with the most ﬁnancial responsibility in the FU. If this person is female and she has a husband
in the FU, then he is designated as head. If she has a boyfriend with whom she has been living for at
least one year, then he is head. However, if she has 1) a husband or a boyfriend who is incapacitated
and unable to fulﬁll the functions of head, 2) a boyfriend who has been living in the FU for less than
a year, 3) no husband/boyfriend, then the FU will have a female head. A new head is selected if last
year’s head moved out of the household unit, died or became incapacitated, or if a single female head
has gotten married. Also, if the family is a split-oﬀ family (hence a new family unit in the sample),
then a new head is chosen.
Samples In addition to the SRC sample, described in the main text, the second sample which
belonged to the original 1968 survey is part of the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) which was
conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Oﬃce of Economic Opportunity. The PSID selected
about 2,000 low-income families with heads under the age of sixty from SEO respondents. In 1997,
the SEO sample was reduced by one-half.
In 1990, PSID added 2,000 Latino households, including families originally from Mexico, Puerto
Rico, and Cuba. While this sample (the so called “Latino sample”) did represent three major groups
of immigrants, it missed out on the full range of post-1968 immigrants, Asians in particular. Because
of this crucial shortcoming, and a lack of suﬃcient funding, the Latino sample was dropped after 1995.
A sample of 441 immigrant families, including Asians, was added in 1997 (the so called “Immigrant
sample”).59
File structure of the PSID data Information on family-level variables and on individual-
level variables (for individuals in families belonging to the PSID sample) are split in two diﬀerent
sets of ﬁles. There are several family-level ﬁles, one for each year (Single-year Family Files), which
contain one record for each family interviewed in the speciﬁed year. Individual income measures, and
a large set of other individual-level variables (e.g., race, marital status) are contained in the family
ﬁles. There is only one cross-year individual ﬁle with some individual-level data (e.g. education)
collected from 1968 to the most recent interviewing wave (Cross-year Individual File). The ﬁle also
contains the ID of the family with whom the person is associated in each year, which can be used to
match individual-level data and family-level data.
The PSID contains many useful data supplements. The Family Income-Plus Files, 1994-2001
contain various constructed income variables for household income and its components. The Hours
of Work and Wage Files, 1994-2001 contain constructed variables for total annual hours worked of
heads and wives. The Wealth Supplement File includes detailed wealth information for 1984, 1989,
1994, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005. It can be linked to the rest of PSID data. Finally, a Validation
Study was designed to assess the quality of economic data obtained in the PSID. The ﬁrst wave of the
Validation Study was conducted in 1983 and a second wave was conducted in 1987. For the Validation
Study, the standard PSID questionnaire was administered to a sample drawn from a single large
manufacturing ﬁrm. Questionnaire results were compared to company records to verify respondents’
59The so-called PSID core sample combines the SRC, SEO, and Immigrant samples. If one plans to combine these
three samples together, weights should be used.
49answers to questions such as earnings and hours worked. This source of data has been frequently used
in the past to assess the size of measurement error in earnings and hours.
Data quality. Traditionally the PSID data has been released in two stages –an early release ﬁle
with variables named ERxxxxx, and a ﬁnal release ﬁle with variables named Vxxxx. The ﬁnal release
ﬁle contains data that has been subject to more stringent cleaning and checking processes and contains
a number of constructed variables (e.g., total annual labor income of the head and wife). From 1994 on
the ﬁnal release ﬁles have not been made available. Instead, clean variables for labor income, annual
hours and several other variables, are available in some of the supplementary data sets. These include
the Family Income-Plus Files which contain various constructed income variables, the Hours of Work
and Wage Files, which are used for data on annual hours worked.
Top-coding and bracketed variables. We deal with top-coded observations by assuming the
underlying distribution for each component of income is Pareto, and by forecasting the mean value
for top-coded observations by extrapolating a Pareto density ﬁtted to the non-top-coded upper end of
the observed distribution. Variables with top-coded observations for which this imputation procedure
was used are marked in Table A.
In some of the early waves, a number of income measures were bracketed. For these variables,
we use the midpoint of each bracket, and 1.5× the top-coded thresholds for observations in the top
bracket. Bracketed variables are marked in Table A.
Variable deﬁnitions. In the PSID all the questions are retrospective, i.e., variables in survey-
year t refer to calendar year t − 1. The interview is usually conducted around March. A complete
listing of the original PSID variables used in the construction of the variables in the ﬁnal data set,
year by year, can be found in Table A. When variables were not deﬁned consistently across years (for
example race was categorized diﬀerently in diﬀerent years), the variables were recoded based on their
original (and less detailed) coding, so as to be consistent across years.
A detailed deﬁnition of the key variables used in the study follows below:
Earnings. For heads and wives, annual earnings includes all income from wages, salaries, com-
missions, bonuses, overtime and the labor part of self-employment income. The PSID splits self-
employment income into asset and labor components using a 50-50 rule.
Annual Hours of Work. For heads and wives, it is deﬁned as the sum of annual hours worked
on the main job, on extra jobs, plus annual hours of overtime. It is computed by the PSID using
information on usual hours worked per week and the number of actual weeks worked in the last year.
Hourly Wage. It is deﬁned as Earnings divided Annual Hours of Work.
Household Earnings. It is deﬁned as the sum of head and wife Earnings.
Household Earnings Plus. It is deﬁned as Household Earnings plus private transfers. Private
transfers include alimony, child support, help from relatives, miscellaneous transfers, private retirement
income, annuities and other retirement income.
Financial Asset Income. It includes income from interests, dividends, trust funds, and the asset
part of self-employment income.
Total Asset Income. It includes Financial Asset Income plus rental income. We do not include an
imputed rental value for owner-occupied housing in the deﬁnition of rental income.
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Income
Household Pre Tax-Income. It is the sum of Household Pre-Government Income plus public trans-
fers. Public transfers include payments from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program, Supplemental Security Income payments, other welfare receipts, plus social security ben-
eﬁts, unemployment beneﬁts, worker’s compensation and veterans’ pensions. In the 1968 and 1969
interview years, many items are missing, so we start computing this measure from the 1970 survey
(actual year 1969).
Taxes. An estimate of household federal income taxes, and state income taxes is computed based
on the NBER’s TAXSIM program. For around 400 PSID households we cannot compute income taxes
since there is no information on state of residence.
Household Disposable Income. It is constructed as the sum of Household Pre-Government Income
plus public transfers less federal and state taxes.
Food Consumption. It is deﬁned as total expenditures on food eaten at home, on food eaten out
of home, on food delivered, and on food purchased using food stamps. There is no food data available
in the 1973, 1988 and 1989 interview years, except for food purchased using food stamps, so we omit
those years in all calculations using this variable.
C CEX
Our data come from the CEX Interview Surveys 1980 through 2006 provided by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). Consumption expenditure data are from the Family Characteristics and Income
(FAMILY) ﬁles except for the years 1982 and 1983, for which the FAMILY ﬁles do not contain
consumption information. For those years consumption data are from the Detailed Expenditures
(MTAB) ﬁles. Consumption data for those years is fully consistent with consumption data for other
years as consumption reported in the FAMILY ﬁles is just an aggregation of the information in the
MTAB ﬁles. Income data are from the FAMILY ﬁles and hours worked by household members (also
used to construct wages) are from the Member Characteristics and Income (MEMBER) ﬁles.
Sample size. The total sample size for the CEX is reported in Table 1 above. The sample size
is not uniform across years as in 1999 there has been a major sample increase. Our basic sample
(sample A) has an average size of around 15500 observations per year during the period 1980-1998,
and its size increases to around 22800 observations per year in the period 1999-2006.
Deﬁnition of “head” We deﬁne the household head to be the oldest male between age 25
and 60. If there are no such males in the household we deﬁne the head as the oldest female age 25–60.
If there is no such female the head is not deﬁned (the household is not included in Sample B).
Non durable consumption expenditures. The deﬁnition of non durable consumption ex-
penditures used in Figures 12 and 13 includes the following categories: food and beverages (including
food away from home and alcoholic beverages), tobacco, apparel and services, personal care, gaso-
line, public transportation, household operation, medical care, entertainment, reading material and
education. Each observation is constructed by adding up household nominal expenditures in these
categories during the three months period preceding the interview and then deﬂating the total using
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sizeable (about 15%) systematic downward bias in reported food expenditures for all the observations
in the years 1982–1987. In order to correct for this bias, we regress the log of food expenditures for all
years on a quadratic time trend, on quadratics in income and total nonfood consumption expenditures,
on weeks worked, on a complete set of household characteristics (including age, education, region of
residence, and family composition), on a dummy for the period 1982–1987, and on the interactions
term of the dummy with all other independent variables. We then use the regression coeﬃcients to
scale up food expenditures for every observation in the period 1982–1987.
Wages, earnings and disposable income Earnings of each household member are computed
as the sum of wages and salaries plus two thirds of business and farm income earned by that member.
Hours worked by each member are computed as number of weeks worked during the year times
the number of hours per week usually worked by that member. Wages are computed as earnings
divided by hours. Household earnings are the sum of earnings of each household member. Household
disposable income includes the sum of wages, salaries, business and farm income earned by each
member plus household ﬁnancial income (including interest, dividends and rents) plus private transfers
(including private pensions, alimony and child support) plus public transfers (including social security,
unemployment compensation, welfare and food stamps) minus total taxes paid (including federal,
state, local and social security contribution).
Imputation Until 2004 the CEX did not use imputation methods to derive income for non
responses.. For the years 2004 and 2005 income imputation is used and it is not always possible to
select out only observations with non imputed measures. In 2006 more information is provided in the
survey and thus it is possible to select only observations with non imputed measures. For consistency,
when possible, we use only observations with non imputed measures.
Top-coding. Only a very limited number of consumption categories are subject to top-coding.
In particular within non-durable consumption expenditures only some categories of medical spending
(such as hospital services) are subject to top-coding. We do not attempt to correct for it and we
simply use the value reported by the CEX (the value is equal to the topcoding threshold before 1996
and equal to the mean of the topcoded observations after 1996). Topcoding in earnings is potentially
more important as the fraction of topcoded earnings observations in some year can reach 2% of the
sample. Also public topcoding thresholds vary across income categories, and across time. We deal
with top-coded observations in the CEX following a procedure as close as possible to the one followed
in CPS. We assume that the underlying distribution for each component of income is Pareto, and we
forecast the mean value for top-coded observations by extrapolating a Pareto density ﬁtted to the non-
top-coded upper end of the observed distribution. This procedure automatically adjusts appropriately
to changes in top code thresholds.
We apply this procedure separately to the three components of individual earnings (salary, business
income and farm income). Some components of disposable income (such dividends or interests) are
also subject to topcoding but, since the fraction of top-coded observations never exceeds 0.1% of the
sample, we simply use the value reported by the CEX (the value is equal to the topcoding threshold
before 1996 and equal to the mean of the topcoded observation after 1996).
Time aggregation We assign an observation to a given year if the interview is completed in
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Weighting All annual aggregate consumption measures (ﬁgure 3) are computed using weighted
data from annual cross sections. All annual consumption inequality measures are computed using un-
weighted data from annual cross sections. Inequality measures are basically not aﬀected by weighting.
Non overlapping income and consumption As mentioned in the main text a given household
is interviewed in the CEX a maximum number of 4 consecutive quarters. Each quarter the household
members is asked to report consumption expenditures information but income questions are only asked
to the households during the ﬁrst and fourth interview. So income information reported for households
in the 2nd and 3rd interview is the same as the one reported in the ﬁrst interview. This implies that for
roughly half of our CEX observations income and consumption do not refer to an overlapping period.
See Gervais and Klein (2008) for a detailed analysis of this issue. In order to assess whether this issue
aﬀects the relation between income and consumption inequality (ﬁgures 12 and 13) we constructed a
sample where we selected only households that are in the CEX for all 4 interviews and we constructed
consumption as the sun of consumption over all 4 interviews and used income in the last interview.
In this case the measures of income and consumption fully overlap. Results for the alternative sample
are very similar to our basic sample (the only diﬀerence is that the alternative sample is more volatile
over time as the sample size is signiﬁcantly smaller)
D Comparability
The unit of analysis in the CPS and the CEX is the household, while in the PSID it is the family
unit. In addition, prior to 1975 and post 1994, labor income and hours worked are not reported in
the PSID for household members who are not heads or spouses. Thus all our labor market statistics
for the PSID refer only to heads and spouses, whereas in the CPS and the CEX we also include other
adult household members.
Individual labor income is deﬁned in all three surveys as the sum of all income from wages, salaries,
commissions, bonuses, and overtime, and the labor part of self-employment income. The CPS imputes
values for missing income data, while the PSID and the CEX do not. In CPS and CEX data we allocate
2/3 of self-employment income to labor and 1/3 to capital, while the reported PSID income data builds
in a 50-50 split. Only in the CEX is it possible to impute rents from owner-occupied housing across the
entire sample period, so for the sake of consistent measurement we exclude imputed rents throughout.
The calculation of taxes diﬀers across data sets. The PSID includes a variable for household income
taxes only up until 1991. Rather than using this variable, we use the NBER’s TAXSIM program to
calculate an estimate of household federal and state income taxes that is comparable across all years
in the sample. The CPS contains imputed values for federal and state income taxes, social security
payroll taxes, and the earned-income tax credit for the 1979-2004 income years. The CEX asks each
household member in the second and ﬁfth interview to report taxes paid (federal, state and local) in
the previous year.
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58PSID CPS CEX
(1967–96, 98, 00, 02) (1967–2005) (1980–2006)
dropped remaining dropped remaining dropped remaining
Initial Sample 123,788 2,217,997 638,237
Missing/miscoded household info(a) 1,516 122,272 8,993 2,209,004 104,302 533,935
Implausible consumption(b) 2,723 531,212
Pos. labor inc. & zero hours 299 121,973 17,599 2,191,405 179 531,033
Wage <0.5*minimum wage 4,298 117,675 121,367 2,070,038 47,046 483,987
Sample A 117,675 2,070,038 483,987
Head age 25–60 32,322 85,353 524,609 1,545,429 137,356 346,631
Sample B 85,353 1,545,429 346,631
Total individuals age 25–60 in sample B(c) 147,540 2,578,035 552683
Individuals age 25–60 with hours>260 30,164 117,376 599,544 1,978,491 97,574 455,109
Sample C 117,376 1,978,491 455,109
(a) In the CEX this category includes households classiﬁed as incomplete income respondents. In the PSID it includes households with missing labor income
and positive hours worked.
(b) In the CEX this category includes households which report non-positive total consumption expenditure (67), households which report non-positive expen-
ditures on non-food consumption (118), and households which report quarterly expenditures on food of less than $100 in 2000 $ (2,538).
(c) In the PSID individuals are only either heads or wives.
Table 1: Sample selection in the PSID, CPS, and CEX.
5
91967–1979 1980–1989 1990–1999 >=2000
PSID CPS PSID CPS CEX PSID CPS CEX PSID CPS CEX
Avg. household size 3.32 3.33 2.98 2.98 2.99 2.89 2.89 2.88 2.77 2.82 2.86
% households with spouse 78.1 72.0 73.1 62.2 62.5 68.9 57.4 58.2 67.3 54.9 56.7
Avg. male age 41.2 41.0 39.7 39.7 39.4 40.9 40.3 40.3 42.1 41.7 41.9
Avg. female age 39.1 41.3 37.9 40.0 39.6 39.3 40.6 40.2 40.7 42.0 41.9
% white male 88.2 89.3 89.6 86.8 87.5 89.2 84.5 86.8 87.9 82.5 84.3
% male ≥16 years edu 23.6 19.4 30.3 26.0 27.8 33.5 28.0 31.3 33.9 30.2 31.0
% female ≥16 years edu 14.4 11.9 22.2 19.1 19.1 27.3 24.6 26.1 30.1 29.8 29.2
Table 2: Selected demographic characteristics of Sample B in the PSID, CPS, and CEX.
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